FREU

Saturday, August 19, 2006

Chronology of refugees

Date(s)
Item
Jul 1990
The Bhutan People's Party (BPP) submitted a memorandum to King Wangchuck in which it demanded the establishment of a democratic system. The Bhutanese government argued that there are already representative political institutions in existence including a National Assembly and a National Advisory Council.
Sep 1990
A Bhutanese embassy official in New Delhi denied reports that some 327 people were shot dead by government troops during two weeks of pro-democracy demonstrations in Bhutan's southern districts. The spokesman said protesters armed with petrol bombs and guns confronted police and soldiers in nine areas along the Kingdom's border with India. He said two policemen and two demonstrators were killed. Members of the Bhutan People's Party are reported to have decapitated officials and kidnapped suspected police informers some of whom were later tortured and killed. The BPP is allegedly using the tea estates in West Bengal province in neighboring India as hideouts (Los Angeles Times, 12/23/95).
Oct 1990
Bhutan fiddled its population count to impress the United Nations, its embassy in New Delhi admitted. It rejected charges by dissidents that it consistently did so to play down the proportion of Nepalese in the country. A spokesman said a population estimate made just before Bhutan joined the UN in 1971 was based on village headmen's reports. "The figure didn't amount to a million, so friends of the (then) King suggested that it would be better to round up the figure. The reason was we were about to enter the U.N." (Reuters, 09/06/90). Several thousand Nepali-origin dissidents demonstrated in Bhutan, alleging that their civil rights were being violated, Bhutan's New Delhi embassy reported. "There was no violence because our district officials accepted the memorandum, they didn't want trouble", he said (Reuters, 09/08/90).
Feb 1991
An influx of Nepali migrants poses the greatest threat to the survival of Bhutan since the seventh century, says the 35-year old King Wangchuck. He makes frequent visits to the troubled southern districts, where most of the immigrants live, in an effort to redress grievances. He pledged, "If I, as the King, cannot protect the sovereignty and integrity of our country and ensure a secure future for our people, then it will be my duty to accept full responsibility and abdicate". Over strong objections of the National Assembly, he has granted amnesty to more than 1,500 "anti-nationals", the government's term for those who are arrested in connection with anti-government activities. The King also exempted Nepalese from rural taxes this year and resumed development activities in the south. However, King Wangchuck warns, "Right now the factor that is at stake for us is basically the revival of the Bhutanese people.... It will be a Nepali state...just like Sikkim...unless this problem is amicably and effectively solved" (Reuters, 02/20/91). Neighboring Sikkim, which was once an independent monarchy, was annexed by India in 1975. Its last ruler was the Bhutanese King's uncle. The ethnic Sikkimese, like the Bhutanese, are of mainly Mongol stock, related to the Tibetans who share their Buddhist religion. Nepali migrants, many of them ethnically Indo-Aryans and mainly Hindu, made the Sikkimese a minority in their own land. The King said a recent census had shown that 28% of Bhutanese citizens were of Nepali origin. Southern Bhutan was ideal for Nepali migration, the King said, because of its free education, free health services, higher wages and available good agricultural land. The King said the revolt was led by a group called the BPP, whose militants number about 1,000. At least 30 people have been killed so far in cross-border raids, kidnappings and clashes with security forces. Still violence continues mostly against Nepalese believed to be government loyalists.
Oct 1991
Three exiled Lhotshampa members of Bhutan's National Assembly began a 24-hour hunger strike in Kathmandu to protest the convening of their legislative body in Thimpu. The trio, who are staging their protest in front of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) meeting, said the session made a "mockery of democracy" since it does not represent the Bhutanese people. Only 14 members of the 150-seat National Assembly are Bhutanese of Nepali origin despite the fact that ethnic Nepalese comprise nearly 53% of Bhutan's population of 600,000, they said. Of the 14, 5 have fled to Nepal and one is in jail (Japan Economic Review, 09/08/91). The Assembly is composed of 105 persons who are elected by limited franchise (heads of family in Hindu areas, village headman in Buddhist areas), 12 elected by the monastic establishment, and 33 high-level officials appointed by the King (US State Dept. Human Rights Report, February 1992).
Dec 1991
"The Bhutanese King must be persuaded to introduce measures aimed at liberalization so that those who have fled Bhutan in the past will be able to return home and live there as dignified citizens", said the Nepali Prime Minister on the eve of his first visit to India (Inter Press Service, 12/03/91). Prime Minister Koirala's government is the first democratically elected in Nepal in 32 years and his Nepali Congress Party has strongly supported the BPP. Some ranking Bhutanese civil servants of Nepali origin have recently resigned and fled the country, saying they have been harassed and persecuted by the royal government in Thimpu.
Feb 1992
Since the enforcement of Bhutan's citizenship law in 1985, about 10,000 foreigners, mostly of Nepali origin, have been expelled. Many more have left because of the government's Bhutanization policy. The BPP, formed in 1989, was banned in 1990 and operates primarily out of Nepal and India. No figures are available on the BPP's actual membership. Over the last decade, the government has implemented a number of liberal measures that have benefited ethnic Nepalese, including the encouragement of intermarriage (the government pays Nu 5,000 for every intermarriage), educating Nepalese students in regions other than their own, and giving priority to the economic development of the south. The government also allotted land and special loans to Nepalese. More young Bhutanese of Nepali origin have entered administrative service. However, the recent reenactment of the nationality law and the Bhutanization program to assimilate ethnic Nepalese have promoted ethnic conflict (State Dept Human Rights Report, 02/92).
May 1992
A group of gunmen assassinated Chimi Dorji, the Deputy District Administrator in the southern district of Geylegphug. They then fled across the border.
Sep 1992
In recent weeks, departing families in Geylegphug (see above entry) are alleged to have looted or destroyed more than two dozen district facilities. Investigators found more than $80,000 in damages at schools, health units and other sites that had been stripped of equipment. They declared as baseless charges that the successor to the Deputy District Administrator (the previous one was assassinated) had pressured the Nepalese families to leave (Los Angeles Times, 09/01/92).
Mar 1993
Senior civil servants fleeing Bhutan say what is going on in their country is "ethnic cleansing" -- a deliberate policy to depopulate the country of non-Drukpa people. S.K. Pradhan of the People's Forum for Human Rights in Bhutan, an exile group based in Kathmandu, says the government is trying to divert international attention away from the issue of human rights. Ravi Nair of the Delhi-based South Asian Human Rights Documentation Center (SAHRDC) agrees: "The violations (in Bhutan) are in blatant disregard of civil and political rights, but they have not caused even a moderate splash in the world media" (Inter Press Service, 03/31/93).
Jun 1993
Nepal and Bhutan have finally agreed to hold talks later this month to resolve the issue of Bhutanese refugees living in crowded camps in eastern Nepal. The refugees now number about 86,000. The flow peaked late last year and hundreds are still arriving every day, relief officials say (Inter Press Service, 06/19/93). Some analysts indicate that Bhutan's new-found keenness to hold talks could have been timed to prevent Kathmandu from raising the issue at the European Community meeting in Brussels and the UN human rights conference in Vienna this month.
Jul 1993
A joint ministerial committee has been formed by the governments of Bhutan and Nepal. The committed has agreed to classify Bhutanese refugees located in Nepal under four categories: a) bona fide Bhutanese evicted forcefully; b) Bhutanese who have emigrated; c) non-Bhutanese people; and d) people who have committed criminal offenses. They also agreed to form a verification committee with five members from each country which would group the refugees into the different categories.
Feb 1994
A Nepali newspaper, The Independent, says that members of the Sarchokpas, the second largest community in Bhutan, organized anti-government demonstrations in eastern and southern Bhutan which were crushed by the security forces. Police opened fire at the demonstrators, killing eight of them. "The Sarchokpas are angry with the King for the false promises made by him during the last three years, when he managed to raise over 10,000 militiamen from among them to crush the southern Bhutanese movement", the newspaper said (Japan Economic Review, 02/23/94). Sarchokpas are said to represent some 30% of Bhutan's population.
Jan 1995
Indian Prime Minister P.V. Rao has advised Nepal and Bhutan to resolve the issue of Bhutanese refugees in Nepal bilaterally and in the spirit of good neighborliness. The two governments had asked India to help mediate their dispute (BBC, 01/17/95).
Mar 1995
During the latest round of talks earlier this month, Bhutan agreed to take full responsibility for the refugees under the category "bona fide Bhutanese evicted forcefully", Nepali officials said. But only a few refugees fall into this category, they added. Nepal also says the "non-Bhutanese" who are long-term residents of Bhutan should be given a chance to return. Bhutan disagrees and has accused the refugees of mounting a campaign of terror in its southern provinces to create a Nepali homeland in Bhutan (Inter Press Service, 03/17/95). The allegations that Nepalese have been forced out prompted King Wangchuck to issue an edict declaring it illegal for any citizen to be involuntarily removed. The US State Dept Human Rights Report 03/95) states that three government officials were convicted on charges of intimidating ethnic Nepalese.
Apr 1995
No progress was reported following the sixth round of talks between the governments of Nepal and Bhutan over the issue of Bhutanese refugees who are residing in eight camps in Nepal. Bhutanese officials indicate that Nepal has now toughened its position by seeking the repatriation of all the refugees. Earlier, Nepal had agreed to not to repatriate those who emigrated on their own along with non-Bhutanese nationals. The refugees left Bhutan in 1991 to reportedly escape the suppression of their rebellion against the monarchical government (BBC, 03/29/95).
Jul 1995
The United States has provided its first direct aid (medical and other supplies) for some 86,000 Bhutanese in refugee camps in Nepal (Agence France Presse, 07/03/95).
Nov 1995
The UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) has denied a report that it is considering drastically reducing or even eliminating aid for Bhutanese refugees in Nepal (Xinhua News Agency, 11/10/95).
Dec 1995
According to the UN World Food Program (WFP), food aid will be supplied to Bhutanese refugees for another two years. The food aid is estimated to cost $16.3 million; since 1992, the WFP has provided aid at a total cost of $21.5 million. Nepal will provide $200,000 worth of food commodities during the next two years (Japan Economic Newswire, 12/10/95). In an in-depth profile, The Los Angeles Times reports on how Bhutan is struggling to modernize while still maintaining traditional Bhutanese (Drukpa) culture. The government has no television station and has attempted to keep foreign broadcasts out of Bhutan until a state facility is developed. Toward this end, in 1992, a royal decree required that all private satellite dishes be dismantled. Less than a dozen or so dishes now remain. Further, a number of laws now explicitly require the promotion of the dominant Buddhist tradition. For example, a new building code requires Bhutanese wooden-frame windows, cornices and other motifs of traditional architecture (12/23/95). New Delhi-based human rights activists assert that about 400 ethnic Nepalis in Bhutan remain jailed as "political prisoners". Bhutan argues that the detainees are guilty of "anti-national" or terrorist acts. In 1992, Amnesty International was successful in convincing Bhutanese authorities to stop shackling inmates (Los Angeles Times, 12/23/95).
Jan 1996
During the first week of this month, Indian security forces arrested numerous Bhutanese Nepalis when they attempted to cross the Nepal-India border. India asserts that it will not allow its territory to be used for any anti-Bhutan movement. The Lhotshampas, who have been residing in refugee camps in Nepal, were undertaking a protest march to Bhutan in order to press for their repatriation and for democratization in the tiny kingdom. Over 90 Bhutanese were arrested while others were sent back to Nepal over two days. A small stretch of Indian territory separates Nepal and Bhutan (UPI, 01/04/96, 01/05/96). A Bhutanese activist, Ratan Gazmere, says that despite Indian opposition, the refugees are planning another march to Thimpu. The protestors are part of the Appeal Movement Coordinating Council (AMCC), a Bhutanese organization based in Nepal. Gazmere says another 250 protestors will leave their refugee camps shortly to undertake the 23 day journey (UPI, 01/11/96).
Jan 12, 1996
Over 96 Bhutanese refugees in jails in West Bengal have begun a food boycott program to press for their unconditional release. The demonstrators were arrested on January 4 for taking part in a refugee march to Bhutan. 102 refugees were released from jail when they agreed to sign a personal release bond (PTI news agency, New Delhi, as reported by BBC, 01/14/96).
Jan 13, 1996
Sir John Stanley, a British Member of Parliament who is on an official visit to Nepal, says that the estimated 100,000 Bhutanese in refugee camps should be allowed to return home. Following a visit to the camps, Stanley criticized Bhutan's intransigence while supporting Nepal's desire to repatriate the refugees. Six rounds of talks have been held between Nepal and Bhutan on the status of the refugees (UPI, 01/13/96).
Jan 14, 1996
A dawn-to-dusk mass strike called by the Association All-India Gurkha League (ABGL) paralyzed three sub-divisions in Darjeeling district. The strike was called to express support for Bhutanese refugees who are trying to return home. The Bhutanese movement has already gained the support of two regional parties, the Communist Party of India Marxist (CPIM) and the Communist party of India, in the state of Bengal (PTI News Agency, as reported in the BBC, 01/15/96).
Jan 17, 1996
Around 150 Bhutanese refugees were detained by Indian security personnel at the India-Nepal border. The refugees, part of the Appeal Movement Coordinating Council (AMCC), were marching to Bhutan to press King Jigme Singhe Wangchuck for their repatriation. Indian security forces have been given special emergency powers of arrest to halt the cross-border march (UPI, 01/17/96).
Jan 18, 1996
An indefinite strike has paralyzed India's eastern Darjeeling district. The strike was called by two student organizations, the All Gurkha Students Union and the Akhil Bharatiya Gurkha League, to press for the release of over 150 Bhutanese who are being held by Indian authorities. The Lhotshampas were arrested as they attempted to march across the India-Nepal border. The term gurkhas is used to refer to ethnic Nepalis who migrated to India and are concentrated in country's northeast (UPI, 01/18/96).
Jan 19, 1996
A report in The San Francisco Chronicle reveals that Bhutan still remains largely isolated from the modern world. There are no television stations, one weekly newspaper, and three lawyers in the small Himalayan country. The average Bhutanese only yearns $180 a year (01/19/96).
Jan 23, 1996
Nepal is calling for talks with Bhutan at the foreign ministers level in order to solve the predicament of up to 100,000 Lhotshampas who are entering their sixth year in Nepali refugee camps. Six rounds of talks at the home minister level have not resolved the issue of refugee verification. Four categories have been agreed upon by which to classify the refugees: bona fide Bhutanese forcefully evicted, Bhutanese who have emigrated, non-Bhutanese, and those Bhutanese who have committed criminal offenses. Bhutan argues that the majority of the refugees left the country voluntarily while Nepal asserts that they are bona fide Bhutanese who were evicted. While India has so far urged the two countries to solve the issue bilaterally, its recent arrest of over 150 Lhotshampas is viewed as sending a signal to Nepal. Under a 1949 treaty, India controls Bhutan's defense and external policies (Inter Press Service, 01/23/96).
Jan 24, 1996
Over 300 Bhutanese refugees have been stopped by Indian authorities as they attempted to cross into India from their camps in Nepal. The march was organized by the AMCC (Agence France Presse, 01/24/96).
Jan 28, 1996
Nepal has asked India to become involved in its dispute with Bhutan over the status of up to 100,000 Lhotshampas who are in Nepali refugee camps. India believes the talks should be resolved bilaterally. India's role in pro-democracy movements in Nepal and Bhutan have led to charges that it is playing the Big Brother role in South Asia (Reuters, 01/28/96).
Feb 1996
A three week sit-in at Nepal's eastern border with India ended on February 15 as Indian security forces arrested the nearly 300 Bhutanese protestors when they entered Indian territory. The sit-in was to protest the continued detention of over 150 Bhutanese refugees and to press demands for free passage to Bhutan (Xinhua News Agency, 02/15/96).
Feb 26, 1996
Another 343 Bhutanese refugees have been arrested as they crossed into Indian territory en route to Bhutan. Over 400 other ethnic Nepali Bhutanese are already in detention. Nepal criticized the Indian action asserting that India did not stop the Bhutanese when they fled their country and crossed India before ending up in UN refugee camps in Nepal (Japan Economic Newswire, 02/26/96).
Feb 28, 1996
Over 420 Bhutanese have been released from Indian jails. They were arrested over the past few weeks as they entered Indian territory in their march to Bhutan. Over 300 others remain in custody (Xinhua News Agency, 02/28/96).
Mar 1, 1996
The UN High Commissioner for Refugees will fund eight Nepali refugee camps for Bhutanese refugees for another year. The cost of running the camps is estimated at more than $13 million. However, the UNHCR says that funding cannot be provided indefinitely (Asiaweek, 03/01/96; Agence France Presse, 04/04/96)).
Mar 1996
The US State Department's Report on Human Rights in Bhutan in 1995 reveals that in 1994 the flow into refugee camps in Nepal had slowed to about 60 persons per month and has declined further. The refugees state that they left Bhutan because of depopulation in the south, heightened apprehension and insecurity, and the desire to be reunited with family members in Nepal. While Bhutan claims that the vast majority in refugee camps are not Bhutanese citizens, the UNHCR reports that almost all of the refugees have documentary proof of Bhutanese nationality. Meanwhile, significant limitations remain on the right to a fair trial, assembly, and association in Bhutan. Political parties are not allowed and Bhutanese Nepali parties such as the Bhutan People's Party are regarded as "terrorist and anti-national". These parties operate from Nepal (March, 1996).
Mar 6, 1996
India and Bhutan have begun talks on developing an extradition treaty to combat cross-border rebel activities. Both countries assert that rebels seek sanctuary across their common border (Reuters, 03/06/96).
Mar 11, 1996
A non-governmental forum being held in Kathmandu, Nepal, has signed a letter asking UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali to personally become involved in the Bhutanese refugee situation. The delegates also appealed for the repatriation of the almost 100,000 Lhotshampas in Nepali refugee camps. Over 300 representatives from around 50 countries attended the forum (Xinhua News Agency, 03/11/96).
Mar 13, 1996
Another 183 Bhutanese refugees have been arresting while attempting to cross Indian territory on their way to Thimpu. Hundreds of Bhutanese refugees are already languishing in Indian jails (UPI, 03/13/96).
Mar 19, 1996
The European Parliament passed a resolution calling on the Bhutan government to take concrete steps to ensure the repatriation of Bhutanese in Nepali refugee camps. It also urged Bhutan to respect minority rights in its territory (Reuter Textline: Agence Europe, 03/19/96).
Mar 31, 1996
The foreign ministers of Nepal and Bhutan will meet on April 4 to discuss the refugee issue. Nepal says the refugee presence has promoted social tensions as the Bhutanese are willing to work for lower wages. Further, the refugees have reportedly been cutting down trees which Nepal says threatens its fragile environment (Reuters, 03/31/96).
Apr 1996
Talks between the Nepalese and Bhutanese governments over the refugee verification process began in Kathmandu on April 4. Prior to the beginning of the negotiations, King Wangchuck asserted that over 99% of those in Nepali refugee camps are not Bhutanese citizens. However, a Bhutanese human rights spokesman states that just the opposite is true (Agence France Presse, 04/04/96).
Apr 7, 1996
An unidentified number of Bhutanese refugees were arrested at Nepal's eastern border as they were attempting to continue their protest march to Bhutan. More than 1000 Lhotshampas have been arrested since January; some of these were recently released when an Indian court ruled that their arrests were illegal (Xinhua News Agency, 04/07/96).
Apr 8, 1996
The first round of talks at the foreign minister level on the status of Bhutanese refugees languishing in Nepali camps has ended with no progress. Nepali officials indicate that the issue of adequate verification of refugee status remains the main stumbling block. Observers believe that little headway can be made until India steps in as a mediator, a role it has so far refused to play. Meanwhile, Bhutanese refugees in Indian jails went on a hunger strike to protest their detention and one refugee group announced that it would wage an "armed struggle" against the Bhutanese government (Reuters, 04/08/96).
Apr 18, 1996
The Appeal Movement Coordinating Council (AMCC) has called off its four-month-long protest march to Bhutan. Instead it will ask the Indian government for free passage and will seek international support to pressure India. Most of the over 1000 Lhotshampas who were arrested by Indian authorities have now been released (Xinhua News Agency, 04/18/96).
Jun 1996
The AMCC re-launched its protest march to Thimpu on June 1 when over 200 refugees left Nepali refugee camps. The protestors will reportedly seek to cross Indian territory through non-traditional routes to avoid arrest by the security forces (Xinhua News Agency, 06/01/96).
Jun 4, 1996
Over 100 refugees were arrested as they crossed into Indian territory on their protest march to Bhutan (Xinhua News Agency, 06/04/96).
Jun 20, 1996
More than 100 Bhutanese refugees residing in Nepal and India were arrested by Indian authorities when they attempted to cross Indian territory. The 100 were part of a funeral procession of over 300 refugees that were seeking to return the body of a protestor to Bhutan for last rites. The protestor died a week ago in an Indian prison. The Nepal-based AMCC, which organized the protest, says that 5 refugees were seriously wounded and another 50 suffered minor injuries when Indian security halted the procession (Xinhua News Agency, 06/20/96).
Jul 1996
A coalition has been formed in Nepal between political parties that represent Bhutanese refugees, human rights groups and Bhutanese intellectuals. The United Front for Democracy in Bhutan (UFD) plans to intensify the struggle for democracy and the free repatriation of the refugees. The front includes the Bhutan Democratic Party (BDP), the Bhutan National Democratic Party (BNDP) and the Druk National Congress (DNC). It will be led by DNC leader Rongthong Kunley Dorji. The UDF plans to lobby Bhutan's donor countries for support (Japan Economic Newswire, 07/11/96; UPI, 07/11/96).
Aug 1996
Nepal has asked the Netherlands to help break the deadlock in its negotiations with Bhutan over the refugee issue. Netherlands Development Cooperation Minister Johannes Pronk says that his country is ready to mediate if the Bhutanese government agrees (Japan Economic Newswire, 08/06/96).
Aug 8, 1996
A member of Nepal's opposition Communist Party of Nepal called upon the government to separate Bhutanese refugees from local inhabitants in the eastern areas. Guru Baral asserts that a barbed wire fence should be built around the refugee camps and that identity cards be issued to the refugees. He stated that more than 25% of the Bhutanese had become involved in marital relationships with the locals (Xinhua News Agency, 08/08/96).
Aug 18, 1996
From 50 to 150 Bhutanese protestors were deported back to India after they crossed from West Bengal into Bhutan on August 15. They were arrested soon after entering Bhutanese territory. The AMCC, which organized the protest marches, called upon Indian Prime Minister H.D. Deve Gowda to allow refugees residing in India free passage to Bhutan (Xinhua News Agency, 08/18/96).
Aug 31, 1996
Some 150 Bhutanese protestors are staging a sit-in at an eastern Indian town near the Bhutanese border to press for their repatriation (Xinhua News Agency, 08/31/96).
Sep 1996
A delegation of unknown size has left UN refugee camps in Nepal to stage a sit-in in India's capital city, New Delhi. It will attempt to draw attention to the plight of the almost 100,000 Lhotshampa refugees (Xinhua News Agency, 09/29/96).
Nov 1996
Twenty Bhutanese refugees from two camps have been arrested by Nepali authorities following an attack on one of the camp's police post. Three policemen were injured. The refugees were reportedly angry that they were not allowed to leave the camp to work outside (Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 11/01/96).
Dec 1996
Despite the large-scale exodus in the early 1990s, the highest-ranking ethnic Nepalese in the Bhutanese government says that Nepalis still constitute 30% of the country's population and occupy 25% of civil service jobs. However, tensions between the two communities, the Drukpas and the Lhotshampas, remain high. An in-depth Asiaweek survey reveals that many Bhutanese believe that the UNHCR's provision of free food was responsible for the refugee problem. This report was compiled following a six month investigation in Nepal, Bhutan, and the refugee camps. It states that it is clear that from the mid-1980s, the Bhutanese government tried to preempt a demographic war while some Nepali politicians actively sought to oust the absolute monarchy. The survey says that Bhutan claims that militants trained in Nepal have launched attacks inside the kingdom. Exiled Bhutanese leaders responded that such actions are beyond their control (Asiaweek, 12/13/96).
Dec 17, 1996
Freedom House's annual survey reveals that more countries were free societies in 1996 then since the human rights organization began its reports in 1972. It says that while 79 out of 191 countries are now considered free, the "worst of the worst" includes states like Bhutan (UPI, 12/17/96).
Dec 30, 1996
Over 600 Bhutanese refugees were loaded onto buses from refugee camps in West Bengal and dumped at the India-Nepal border. It is not clear whether the refugees were originally from Nepali or Indian refugee camps. Refugees have periodically attempted to cross India en route to Bhutan (Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 12/30/96; UPI, 12/30/96).
Jan 1997
Thousands of Bhutanese refugees are continuing a sit-in at the India-Nepal border following efforts by the Indian government to deport some 850 Bhutanese to Nepal on December 30. The protest, which has blocked transport between India and Nepal, is beginning to cause shortages of daily consumer goods in Nepal. The protestors are holding 13 Indian buses that transported the refugees and state they will release them if the refugees are allowed to return to India (Xinhua News Agency, 01/02/97).
Jan 3, 1997
A sit-in by thousands of Bhutanese refugees at the India-Nepal border has ended. The AMCC called off the action, claiming that the Indian government had admitted its mistake in deporting the Lhotshampas. Thirteen Indian buses were also released. However, an Indian official denied that any agreement was reached. Indications are that the deported refugees will remain in Nepal (Xinhua News Agency, 01/03/97).
Jan 8, 1997
India will ask for the cooperation of Bangladesh and Bhutan to help flush out militants who operate in its seven northeastern states. New Delhi claims that the militants often seek sanctuary in neighboring states (Reuters, 01/08/97).
Jan 25, 1997
India claims that its six-month old "asymmetrical" foreign policy toward its regional neighbors means that New Delhi will do more for its neighbors than it expects in return. The cornerstone of this policy is the promotion of regional harmony and economic cooperation. The seven nations of SAARC have already agreed to establish a regional free-trade zone. India has also solved long-standing water disputes with Bangladesh and Nepal and hopes to normalize relations with Pakistan. South Asian countries have generally viewed India with distrust, accusing it of attempting to play a Big Brother role (Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 01/25/97).
Feb 1997
The US State Department’s Report on Human Rights Practices in Bhutan in 1996 indicates that some state security forces committed human rights abuses against the Lhotshampas. Two people were arrested for "anti-national" activities in southern Bhutan. Bhutanese Nepalis who attempted to re-enter the country were forcibly stopped (02/97).
Mar 18, 1997
Some 15,000 Bhutanese refugees in Nepali camps go on a hunger strike to press the United Nations to help ensure their return. The action is organized by the Appeal Movement Coordinating Council (AMCC) (Xinhua News Agency, 03/18/97).
Apr 14, 1997
The Bhutanese refugees end their almost month-long hunger strike (Xinhua News Agency, 04/14/97).
Apr 19, 1997
In Kathmandu, the United Front for Democracy demanded the release of its leader, Rongthong Dorji, an ethnic Sarchop, who was arrested in New Dehli on the 18th. He was arrested for having no proper travel documents. The UFD is afraid he will be handed over to the Bhutanese government who he fled in 1991. (Japan Economic Newswire)
Apr 20, 1997
Some 20,000 Bhutanese hold two rallies in Nepal to oppose the Indian government’s arrest of Rongthong Kunley Dorji, the leader of the United Front for Democracy in Bhutan (UDF). The UDF was established in Nepal in 1996 to press for democracy and the repatriation of the refugees. (Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 04/20/97).
Apr 25, 1997
Bhutan's pro-democracy leader Teknath Rizal completed the 9th day of an indefinite fast in his prison cell at Chamgang in the capital Thimbu. He demands to be given an audience with King Wangchuck to discuss the country's political crisis. Rizal was a member of the National Assembly until 1988 when he spoke out against the forced eviction of Napali-speaking Bhutanese. He lived in exile in Nepal until November 1989 when he was kidnapped and returned to Bhutan. He was convicted to life imprisonment in 1993 after three years in solitary confinement. (Japan Economic Newswire)
May 1997
Reports indicate that there has been a rise in crime and violence in southern Bhutan, especially close to the Indian border. The Lhotshampas are assumed to be involved (Asia & Pacific Review: World of Information, 05/97).
May 14, 1997
An Indian court told the government to consider releasing Bhutan opposition leader Dorji. He has been lobbying Indian leaders and met with donor governments to plead his case. (Agence France Press)
May 20, 1997
While in Singapore, Bhutan's Foreign Minister Lyonpo Dawa Tsering stated that Bhutan is under threat of being overrun by "Nepalese" (The Straights Times, Singapore).
Jun 5, 1997
Some 35 Lhotshampas were arrested in Kathmandu prior to a planned protest which was to coincide with a visit by Indian Prime Minister Inder Kumar Gujral (Agence France Presse, 06/05/97).
Jul 14, 1997
Some observers believe that Bhutan is ready to launch another ethnic cleansing campaign against the country’s Nepalese population. The state-owned newspaper, Kuensel, recently reported a national assembly decision which makes it compulsory for relatives of Bhutanese nationals of Nepali origin to retire from government jobs. The newspaper claims that the Nepalis are attempting to destabilize the kingdom and disrupt peace and harmony (Japan Economic Newswire, 07/14/97).
Aug 1, 1997
Official sources in Nepal indicate that a breakthrough was achieved in recent talks with Bhutan. Bhutan has reportedly agreed to major concessions that will help facilitate the return of the refugees. In particular, those refugees who voluntarily left will now be allowed to return. Previously, Bhutan only agreed to accept those who were forcibly evicted (Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 08/01/97).
Oct 1, 1997
The UDF says that it will launch a peaceful movement to press for political reforms in Bhutan. Acting UDF leader Thinly Penjore, left Bhutan last month and said that discrimination is widespread in the civil service, business, and the education system, and that religious persecution was becoming common place. (Japanese Economic Newswire).
Dec 18, 1997
Bhutanese refugee groups and Nepali government officials urge India to help persuade Bhutan to accept the Lhotshampa refugees. India says that the refugees are a bilateral issue between Nepal and Bhutan (Inter Press Service, 12/18/97).
Dec 27, 1997
The Appeal Movement Coordinating Council (AMCC) states that there are more than 100 political prisoners in Bhutan, including scores of monks (Agence France Presse, 12/27/97).
Jan 15, 1998
The Bhutanese government begins distributing land in the south that belongs to the Lhotshampa refugees. The Federation of Human Rights Organizations of Bhutan, which is based in Nepal, says that the land is being used to resettle some 370 families from northern Bhutan. Several hundred Bhutanese refugees demonstrate in Kathmandu to protest the action (Agence France Presse, 01/15/98).
Jan 18, 1998
A new report by Amnesty International states that political activists in Bhutan are regularly tortured and any dissenters are persecuted. More than 150 political prisoners are in custody. Most of those targeted are members of the Sarchop ethnic group who reside in eastern areas. The Sarchops have been organizing grassroots campaigns to press for democratic reforms and respect for human rights. Amnesty also reports that many Lhotshampas refuse to wear the required national dress (Sunday Telegraph, 01/18/98; Amnesty International, "Bhutan: Crack-Down on Anti-Nationals in the East", 01/14/98).
Feb 11, 1998
Some 220 Lhotshampa civil servants (doctors and engineers) were dismissed last month by the Bhutanese government (Guardian, 02/11/98). There are reports of various acts of violence in Bhutan including the destruction of bridges, pylons, and buildings. The Lhotshampas are thought to be involved (Times Newspapers, 02/11/98).
May 8, 1998
The United Front for Democracy in Bhutan (UDF) declares that it is ready to launch a revolution to overthrow Bhutan’s monarchy. The UDF says that it has given up hope that the King will introduce reforms (Agence France Presse, 05/08/98).
Jun 1998
For the first time in 26 years, Bhutan’s King Wangchuck dissolved the cabinet and appointed six new ministers. Henceforth, the cabinet will be elected and be responsible to the national assembly. The national assembly will also have wider powers including the ability to call for a no-confidence vote against the king. If such a vote is passed by two-thirds of the assembly, the king would be required to abdicate. Analysts indicate that the reforms might be a move to ease ethnic tensions within the country and to improve Bhutan’s international image (Agence France Presse, 07/06/98; Emerging Markets Datafile, 09/22/98).
Jul 8, 1998
The UDF, based in exile in Nepal, contends that recent reforms in Bhutan are a sham. It says that there are no Nepalis among the six newly appointed ministers. The UDF wants the King to initiate talks with pro-democracy groups (Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 07/08/98).
Aug 14, 1998
Nepalese officials accuse Bhutan of stalling the resumption of talks regarding the Lhotshampa refugees. Formed in 1993, the Nepal-Bhutan Joint Ministerial Level Committee last met in early 1996 (Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 08/14/98).
Oct 15, 1998
Divisions have reportedly arisen between the leaders of the United Front for Democracy in Bhutan (UDF). The organization’s leader, Rongthong Kunley Dorji, is currently in New Delhi where he is out on bail. The acting leader, Thinley Penjore, who has been responsible for organizing protests for the past 18 months, is reported to be gaining in popularity (Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 10/15/98).
Nov 17, 1998
The World Food Programme will provide Nepal with $6.32 million of assistance next year to help look after the Bhutanese refugees (Agence France Presse, 11/17/98).
Nov 21, 1998
A Nepalese delegation departs for Bhutan to hold talks about the return of the Bhutanese refugees (Japan Economic Newswire, 11/21/98).
Nov 26, 1998
Nepal and Bhutan agree to hold a new round of ministerial talks on the refugees in January 1999. Nepal says that it will not seek Indian involvement as it is a bilateral issue. Under a 1949 treaty, India controls Bhutan’s foreign and defense policies (Xinhua News Agency, 11/26/98).
Jan 23, 1999
Analysts and Bhutanese refugees deny recent newspaper reports that the Lhotshampa refugees are being trained by the United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA) insurgents in Bhutan. ULFA is reported to have bases in Bhutan. A South Asian human rights group asserts that Indian insurgent groups, specifically the Bodos and ULFA, were responsible for committing some of the atrocities against the Nepalese in southern Bhutan (BBC: Kathmandu Post, 01/22/99).
Jun 2, 1999
In Nepal, some 40,000 Lhotshampas demonstrate in refugee camps while another 10,000 stage a hunger strike to protest celebrations in Bhutan that are marking the 25th anniversary of the enthronement of King Jigme Singye Wangchuck. There are more than 90,000 Bhutanese refugees in Nepali camps and another 30,000 in India. Analysts contend that the refugee problem will remain unsolved until India intervenes (Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 06/02/99). The king’s enthronement ceremony is the first broadcast on Bhutan’s newly-established television network. Previously, there were no local TV networks and the use of satellites to obtain foreign broadcasts was not allowed. This year, Bhutan will also establish its first internet service. Last month, a digital telephone network was inaugurated (Guardian, 06/03/99).
Jun 3, 1999
The Bhutan People’s Party submits a 10-point memorandum to the King. It calls for the establishment of a multi-party democracy within a constitutional monarchy, respect for human rights, and the return of the Lhotshampa refugees. Political parties are banned in Bhutan (Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 06/03/99).
Dec 17, 1999
The King reportedly released some 200 prisoners, including Rizal on National Day. (BBC, 12/23/99)
Jan 2000
The Bhutan Refugee Representative Repatriation Committee has threatened to enter Bhutan en masse if no steps are taken towards their repatriation by May. They declared 2000 the Year of Peace for Bhutan's Refugee Crisis. At a mass rally in east Nepal, the refugees demanded that the Bhutan government immediately stop a resettlement program on land that belonged to the refugees and the release of all political prisoners. (BBC, 1/9/00)

THE BHUTANESE REFUGEES: BETWEEN VERIFICATION, REPATRIATION AND ROYAL REALPOLITIK -MICHAEL HUTT

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Peace and Democracy in South Asia, Volume 1, Number 1, January 2005.

THE BHUTANESE REFUGEES: BETWEEN VERIFICATION, REPATRIATION AND ROYAL REALPOLITIK MICHAEL HUTT ___________________________________________________________________________________ABSTRACT This paper brings out the plight of about one hundred thousand Nepali refugees from Bhutan who were forced toflee the country by the monarchical state in late 1980s and early 1990s.These refugees are, by and large, ignoredby the world that is otherwise quite supportive of democratic movements like the one the refugees had launched inBhutan in response to highly constrictive legislations relating to marriage and dress passed by the state since 1980s, including the census of the southern Bhutan with a clear view to de-nationalising the so-called ‘Lhotsampas’. The paper further shows how the negotiation between Bhutan and Nepal, the identification of the bonafide nationals of Bhutan in the refugee camps of southern Nepal, the terms and conditions for such identification and repatriation, etc. were all dictated by Bhutan ignoring the UNHCR, acquiesced by Nepal, andtacitly supported by India. Finally, the author examines the circumstances forcing Nepal to kowtow before Bhutanand questions the stand taken by India, the Asian superpower, which supported anti-establishment in Nepal and opposed anti-establishment in Bhutan. ___________________________________________________________________________________During the autumn months of 2002, some warmth returned to the troubled relationship between the governments of Bhutan and Nepal. It seemed that the twolandlocked (effectively India-locked) Himalayan kingdoms had many interests in common, and that their long-standing disagreement over the fate of the 102,000 people living in Bhutanese refugee camps in southeastern Nepal represented an obstacle to pursuing those interests. Most of these people claimed to have left Bhutan against their will during the early 1990s; approximately one third of them werechildren born since that exodus took place. BHUTAN AND ITS PEOPLES Bhutan is the sub-continent’s most thinly populated state, with an official total population of only 680,000 in a country approximately one-third the size of Bangladesh. At least 60% of its surface area is forested, and the capital, Thimphu, has a population of less than 50,000. Despite its small size, the population is ethnically diverse. The four main ethnic categories are the Ngalong in the west, the ‘central Bhutanese’, the Sharchop in the east, and the Lhotshampa or ‘Nepali Bhutanese’ in the south. The Ngalong and central Bhutanese are politically dominant. The Ngalongs’ language, Dzongkha, has been the national language since 1961, and the Drukpa Kargyü school of Mahayana Buddhism, which is predominant in western Bhutan, has statutory representation in state institutions. The Bhutanese commonly make a distinction between the Buddhist ‘Drukpas’ of the north and the Nepali-speaking southerners, who are known as Hindu. In the early 1990s, the Dutch linguist George van Driem reported the presence of 160,000 speakers of Dzongkha, 138,000 Dr. Michael Hutt is Reader in Nepal and Himalayan Studies & Associate Dean of the Faculty of Languages andCultures at the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London. Email: mh8@soas.ac.uk
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Michael Hutt, The Bhutanese Refugees speakers of Tshangla (the language spoken by the majority of Sharchops) and 156,000 speakers of Nepali, representing 26.5%, 22.9% and 25.9% respectively of a total population of 602,800 (van Driem 1994: 92).1THE LHOTSHAMPAS Bhutan’s Lhotshampas are the descendants of peasant farmers from Nepal who began to migrate to southern Bhutan after the Anglo-Bhutanese war of 1865. Successive generations cleared the forests and formed agrarian communities that quickly became Bhutan’s main producers of food. Their numbers were augmented by later migrants, who continued to be brought in by licensed contractors until about 1930. The Nepalisettlers became the kingdom’s main source of cash income: unlike the Drukpas of the north, who paid their taxes in kind right up until the late 1950s, British colonialrecords show that Nepali settlers in south-west Bhutan were paying taxes in cash even before the Bhutanese monarchy was established in 1907 (Hutt 2003: 74-82). Until the 1950s, Bhutan was not a unified polity: different systems of administration were maintained in different parts of the country. In the south, the local contractors and their descendants remained powerful. The revenue raised in certain southern districts was submitted not to the central government but to a local governor based across the Indian border in Kalimpong.2During the early 1950s the whole of Bhutan was brought under a single administrative system, with its capital at Thimphu. King Jigme Dorji Wangchuck and his Prime Minister Jigme Palden Dorje embarked on a programme of political institution-building and infrastructure development. The measures they undertook included a land reform programme, the establishment of an elected National Assembly in 1953, the freeing of serfs, the enactment of the Nationality Law of Bhutan (which granted full citizenship to all Lhotshampas) in 1958, and the establishment of a Royal Advisory Council. Bhutan’s first Five-Year Plan was inaugurated in 1961, and the construction of a road linking Thimphu with India was completed in 1963. These reforms had the effect of integrating the economy and administration of the south with those of the rest of Bhutan, and bringing its Lhotshampa population into the national mainstream (see Hutt 2003: 127-44; Rose 1977). Lhotshampas entered government service in increasing numbers and began to play an important role in national life. In the mid-1980s, however, this impetus towards the integration of the southerners began to slow. It would appear that the assimilation process had accelerated too quickly for some powerful members of the elite, who felt that the newly admitted Lhotshampas were bringing with themdemocratic claims and values. These apprehensions were greatly heightened by the violence of the Gorkhaland movement in the Darjeeling district of West Bengal, especially between 1986 and 1988, and by the success of the democratic movement in Nepal in 1990. 1However, it was not clear whether these figures included or excluded the Nepali-speaking Bhutanese who wereliving in refugee camps in Nepal at the time of van Driem’s survey (Aris 1994a: 14). 2For my recent book on the Lhotshampas (Hutt 2003), I derived a great deal of information on conditions insouthern Bhutan during the 1930s from a report by Captain C.J. Morris of the 3rdGurkha Rifles, held in the British Library in London. The complete text of this report is reproduced in Sinha (2001: 144-60). 45
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Michael Hutt, The Bhutanese Refugees CITIZENSHIP LEGISLATION New citizenship Acts, introduced in 1977 and 1985, narrowed the terms on which Bhutanese citizenship could be acquired. A Marriage Act promulgated in 1980 made it more difficult for Bhutanese to marry non-Bhutanese, and disqualified those who did so from receiving various state benefits. The wearing of Bhutanese national costume became mandatory for all Bhutanese in an increased number of contexts(Hutt 2003: 160-77; Rose 1994: 191-92; Ura 1994; Zeppa 1999: 140-1, 188-9), and the Nepali language was removed from school curricula (Hutt 2003: 183-90; Thinley 1994: 61; van Driem 1994: 101-2). Until the late 1980s feelings of disquiet werelargely restricted to more educated Lhotshampas. But the annual census conducted in southern districts from 1988 onward impinged upon the Lhotshampa population moregenerally. While the Bhutanese government claims that the exercise was devised to address a growing problem of illegal immigration in southern Bhutan, many Lhotshampas saw it as an initiative designed to reduce the size of the ethnic Nepalipopulation of Bhutan. During the censuses, each adult member of a household was required to present himself or herself to a census team from the central government when itvisited his/her locality. In order to be recorded in the census register, the Lhotshampas had to produce a tax receipt dated 1958, the year of the enactment of Bhutan’s first Nationality Law, and prove their membership of the relevant household if the name on the receipt was not their own. The citizenship cards that had beenissued to all Bhutanese in the years leading up to 1988 were no longer accepted as proof of Bhutanese citizenship, and in some cases these were confiscated during the census. A Certificate of Origin (C.O.) had to be produced by individuals who had moved to their place of residence after 1958. Typically, married women were required to return in person to their places of birth and acquire a C.O. from the authorities there. Each individual’s name was added to one of the seven lists, ranging from ‘F1’, genuine Bhutanese citizens, to ‘F7’, non-nationals, with five intermediate categories in between (Amnesty International 1992: 5-6). An individual who could produce a 1958 receipt for tax paid on the land registered in their or an ancestor’sname, and could convince officials that both of their parents were Bhutanese nationals, was listed under F1. Women who had come in from outside Bhutan to marry could not produce C.O.s and were therefore liable to be registered as non-nationals (see Hutt 2003: 147-59 and Lee 1998 for discussions of Bhutanese citizenship Acts). LHOTSHAMPA DISSENT AND FLIGHT In April 1989, Tek Nath Rizal, a Lhotshampa member of the Royal Advisory Council, attempted to alert the king of growing public unease about the census in the south, but was arrested and detained briefly for his temerity. Once released, he fled to Nepal and became a focal point for Lhotshampa dissident activists. He and two of his associates were seized by Nepalese police in November 1989 and handed over to the Bhutanese authorities. He was tried and found guilty of treason three years after his arrest and remained in prison until December 1999.33Rizal, who suffered from numerous health problems after his release, spent most of the next four years living a marginal existence in Bhutan and India. He returned to Nepal in October 2003 to assume a more prominent role as a spokesman for the refugees. 46
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Michael Hutt, The Bhutanese Refugees In September and October 1990, Lhotshampa activists orchestrated mass public demonstrations, in which demands for civil and cultural rights were presented to district headquarters all across southern Bhutan (Muni 1991; Hutt 2003: 204-10). After the demonstrations, the Bhutanese army and police began the task of identifying participants and supporters, who were later arrested. Many were held for months without trial. Those who were released invariably left Bhutan and joined relatives in the swelling refugee camps in Nepal. Many claimed that they would nothave been released if they had not pledged in writing to leave the country, and that they would have been evicted forcibly had they not left immediately. Once the head of a family had left Bhutan, it was alleged that pressure was put on other family members to follow him. After the demonstrations, many new rules and procedures were introduced in the south. Lhotshampas saw these measures as attempts to attack the economic and social bases of their communities. Restrictions were placed on the transportation of essential commodities such as salt. Applicants for scholarships andcivil service appointments had to produce a ‘No Objection Certificate’ (N.O.C.) that they had acquired from the Royal Bhutan Police. This certified that the holder had aclean record, i.e., that they had not taken part in oppositional activity, and were notrelated to anyone who had. The N.O.C. was also required of children seeking admission to school, with the result that children whose parents had taken part, or were suspected of taking part, in ‘anti-national activities’ had difficulties gainingaccess to formal education. Many individuals were prevented from selling their cash crops in the open market and made to hand them over to the local administration, which issued receipts but no payments. Soon the Bhutanese government reported that its census operations had detected the presence in southern Bhutan of over 100,000 illegal immigrants (RGB 1991: 2-3). The government claimed that since 1958 large numbers of Nepalese migrants had entered southern Bhutan to take advantage of its economic prosperity (RGB 1993: 4). A proposal for a ‘Green Belt’ across the India-Bhutan border, which would have displaced many thousands of Lhotshampas from their homes, wasdropped in 1990 (Sinha 2001: 228-30). But the census operations quickly became atool not only for the identification and eviction of illegal immigrants but also for thedispossession and banishment of dissidents, the wealthy, the educated, and various other categories of Lhotshampa citizen. Kuensel, the only newspaper published inside Bhutan, recorded a dramatic increase in violent crime, robbery and destruction of development infrastructure in southern Bhutan during the early 1990s, and blamed all such crimes on ‘anti-national terrorists’. It often alleged that the ‘terrorists’ had come from the refugee camps in Nepal, and on at least one occasion this was admitted by a dissidentorganisation.4The stringent measures imposed on southern Bhutan, which included the closure of almost every school, were justified in terms of national security: schools were said to be prime targets for terrorist attacks. In September 1991 the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) assumed responsibility for the coordination of emergency relief4‘Shame on us’ The Bhutan Review, 1: 1 (January 1993). This monthly newspaper was published by the Human Rights Organization of Bhutan for several years from Kathmandu. 47
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Michael Hutt, The Bhutanese Refugees assistance for Bhutanese refugees in Nepal. Bhutanese refugee camps were established at five different sites: Timai, Goldhap, Beldangi and Khudunabari in Jhapa district, and Sanishchare (Pathri) in Morang, and 2331 survivors of physical torture had been identified in these camps by late 1994 (see Adhikari 1995; Shrestha, et al, 1995, 1998). The Bhutanese government emphasized that the Nepalese governmentdid not screen arrivals until June 1993, when the main influx had all but ceased, and adopted a hostile attitude to UNHCR’s operations in Nepal. It maintained consistentlyfor ten years that few, if any, of the people in the camps were genuine refugees fromBhutan, and dismissed the citizenship cards and tax receipts that many of them held as forgeries or stolen documents (see Thinley 1994: 70-1). Meanwhile, Nepalese politicians of every persuasion repeatedly referred to the presence of ‘one lakh’ (100,000) Bhutanese refugees in their country, and declared that they would ensure that all of them would soon return to Bhutan ‘with honour and dignity’. NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN BHUTAN AND NEPALIn 1993 the governments of Bhutan and Nepal agreed to establish a Ministerial Joint Committee (MJC) which would work towards a resolution of the refugee problem. Atits first meeting, the MJC agreed that it would ‘verify’ the status of ‘the people in the camps’ (the term ‘refugee’ was scrupulously avoided). The Bhutanese proposed, and the Nepalese agreed, that the verification exercise would sort them into four categories: (1) Bonafide Bhutanese if they have been evicted forcibly; (2) Bhutanese who emigrated; (3) Non-Bhutanese people; and (4) Bhutanese who have committed criminal acts. The Nepalese team was strongly criticised by refugee leaders and the Nepalese media for having agreed to these four categories. It was likely that many people would fallinto category 2 (unless it could be proved that emigration forms were signed under duress), category 3 (simply for leaving the country and thereby forfeiting their citizenship), or category 4 (for having demonstrated against government policies). In Bhutan, each annual meeting of the National Assembly called for a ban on the return of ‘people who had left the country’, and as political instability worsened in Nepal the refugee issue slipped down the domestic agenda. The MJC metat irregular intervals, but made very little progress on any front. The Lhotshampa activists became less audible and their political parties and human rights organisations split and splintered. The camp population therefore had little option but to wait andhope. Meanwhile, concern began to be expressed about the ‘underlying potential for violence’ among the growing number of young adults in the camps, especially as educational provision declined (cf. John 2000) and Maoist insurgents began to be active in and around the camps. Those Lhotshampas who remained in Bhutan continued to face discrimination in the fields of employment, education, freedom of movement, and citizenship (HRW 2003: 16-18). In July 1998, 429 relatives of ‘anti-nationals’ had to 48
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Michael Hutt, The Bhutanese Refugees take ‘compulsory retirement’ from Bhutanese government service, in line with a National Assembly resolution carried the previous year.5The Bhutanese government’s policy of resettling northern Bhutanese on lands vacated by the departing Lhotshampas (see Habitat International Coalition 2000 for case studies) undermined any prospect of repatriation. The Bhutanese government also faced increasing pressure to expel guerillas who were waging a campaign against the Indian government from camps they had established in Bhutan’s southeastern districts.6THE JOINT VERIFICATION EXERCISE At the end of 2000, possibly as a result of a visit to Bhutan and Nepal by two American secretaries of state, it was agreed that a team of Nepalese and Bhutanese officials would commence the process of verification negotiated in 1993. On 26 March 2001, ‘joint verification’ began for the population of Khudunabari, one of thesmaller camps, where some 12,500 people were living in 1,964 bamboo huts. During the monsoon rains of 2001, the author watched the buses come and go between Khudunabari and the Joint Verification Team (JVT)’s office in Damak. The JVT comprised five Nepali and five Bhutanese members (all men for most of the period), and between ten and twelve families were delivered to their office each day. Two proforma documents were filled in for each individual of 25 years or over andsupporting documents were photocopied. The Khudunabari verification exercise was completed on 14 December 2001, but the outcome remained undisclosed for 17 months. In early 2003, Bhutanese officials reassured international donors at a meetingin Geneva of their commitment to finding a solution to the refugee problem. The JVT subsequently spent many weeks in secret discussions in Thimphu before presenting its report to the fourteenth meeting of the Ministerial Joint Committee (MJC) in Kathmandu in May 2003. The categorization of the Khudunabari refugees was reported as follows: FamiliesIndividuals% (1) Bonafide Bhutanese 74 293 2.5 (2) Emigrants 2182 8595 70.5 (3) Non-Bhutanese 817 2948 24.2 (4) Criminals 85 347 2.8 Total 3158 12,183 100 According to the MJC’s joint press release of 21 May 2003, the Royal Government of Bhutan would take ‘full responsibility’ for the 293 individuals categorised as ‘bonafide Bhutanese evicted forcibly’: these people would be permitted to return and would be issued with citizenship cards. Those of the 8595 ‘Bhutanese who emigrated’ who wished to return would be given the option of re-applying for Bhutanese citizenship ‘in a liberal interpretation of the Bhutanese Citizenship andImmigration Laws’, while those who did not wish to return would be ‘given the 5This figure is drawn from the U.S. Department of State’s country report on human rights practices in Bhutan, dated February 2001. See also ‘RCSC has carried out Assembly resolution’ Kuensel, July 25, 1998. 6These guerillas reportedly belong to the United Liberation Front of Assam, the National Democratic Front ofBodoland, and the Kamtapur Liberation Organization. In early November 2003, both the king and the Bhutanese prime minister are reported to have visited their camps to negotiate with the leaders (The Telegraph, Calcutta, 5November 2003). 49
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Michael Hutt, The Bhutanese Refugees option to apply for Nepalese citizenship in accordance with the laws of the Kingdom of Nepal’. Non-Bhutanese would have to ‘return to their respective countries’, and‘Bhutanese who have committed criminal acts’ would have ‘full opportunity to prove their innocence in the court of law in Bhutan.’ All of those thus categorised had the right to appeal against their categorisation within 15 days, but their appeal would be considered only upon the ‘presentation of new material evidence’ or ‘determination of clear error in the process’.7The ‘emigrants’ category caused the greatest concern to the international community. It had long been known that a large number of people in the camps were in danger of falling into this category. It was likely that a particularly high proportion would be found in Khudunabari, because this camp was the last to beestablished, well after the Bhutanese authorities had thoroughly bureaucratised the eviction process. All of the camps contained many people who were coerced or tricked into signing emigration forms, who signed written commitments to leave the country in order to secure the release of relatives imprisoned for political offences, or who fled from a generalised state of fear and insecurity.8Many observers had assumed that the long delay in finalising the verification report was being caused by protracted negotiations over such cases. The true reasons for flight were being clarified and a number of people were being transferred to category 1 once it was proved that their ‘emigration’ had been far from ‘voluntary’. However, it appears that the JVT simply took this category at face value, without delving into the multifariousreasons for flight. The verification process was strongly criticised in Nepal and abroad. The only people interviewed were male heads of households, and most of the questioning allegedly came from the Bhutanese members of the JVT. Refugee organisations alleged that this included individuals who had been involved in theeviction process a decade earlier. In some cases, individual members of a single family found themselves put into different categories.For instance, certain individuals who had left Bhutan as minors and therefore had no identity papers oftheir own were categorised as non-Bhutanese even though their parents were put into other categories, while young children belonging to a household whose head was categorised as a ‘criminal’ also became criminals. Both governments made a concerted effort to present the verification exercise as a major breakthrough. When the Bhutanese government announced after the 15thMJC meeting, held in Thimphu in October 2003, that all of the refugeeswould be able to return except for the non-Bhutanese and the ‘criminal cheiftains’,this was hailed as a further major concession. Having consistently denied for over a decade that the camps contained any significant number of its own people, it was pointed out, the Bhutanese government had now accepted that around 75% of the population of this first camp either were, or had once been, Bhutanese citizens. Faced with vociferous protests against any prospect of repatriation from people’s 7In the event, almost every household lodged an appeal within the deadline (see ‘94 pc refugees appeal against JVT report’, The Kathmandu Post, 4 July, 2003). 8For an account of the eviction of a group of families who were subsequently presented as ‘voluntary emigrants’by the Bhutanese authorities, see Amnesty International (1994: 15-16), Dixit (1992: 16) and Hutt (2003: 221-7). The paper trail left by one eviction process may be followed on www.bhootan.org (check ‘documents’, then‘voluntary emigration’).50
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Michael Hutt, The Bhutanese Refugees representatives in Bhutan’s National Assembly in July 2003, the Bhutanese foreign minister made the first real admission to that body that some of the ‘people in the camps’ were indeed ‘bonafide Bhutanese who had been evicted forcibly’. Theforeign minister explained that some of the people placed in the first category were those who had proved that they were Bhutanese citizens and had shown written eviction notices that they had received. The minister said that, in the early 1990s, some local officials and gups had gone beyond the call of duty and had issued eviction notices.9In reality, the Bhutanese government had made all but 293 of the 12,500 people living in the Khudunabari camp an offer that was very difficult forthem to accept. Those categorised as ‘emigrants’ could apply for Bhutanese citizenship but they would have to travel to Bhutan to submit their applications. No decisions would be reached on these for a minimum period of two years, and during this time the applicants would be issued with special identity cards and provided with employment. Although the categorisation was carried out on a family basis, applications would only be accepted on an individual basis, and applicants wouldhave to remain in Bhutan for the duration of the probation period. They would not engage in nor have any past record of ‘anti-national’ activity; they would have to beable to speak Dzongkha, and they would need a ‘good knowledge’ of the culture and history of Bhutan. It was not clear where they would live during the two-year probation period. Most had owned houses and land in southern Bhutan, but many knew that their houses had been demolished after their departure, and many houseswere probably now occupied by people who had moved down from the north ingovernment resettlement schemes. In addition, some of the districts from which people had fled over a decade earlier now contained the bases of Assamese and Bodoinsurgents. It was not likely that the repatriated refugees would return to their lives asself-sufficient tax-paying farmers, nor was it clear whether they would be grantedrights to healthcare, education and so on. The terms on which the offer was made failed to recognise or address the fact that ‘the story of trust betrayed’ is ‘a touchstone of the refugee experience’ (Layoun 1990: 80). In the immediate aftermath of the announcement of the JVToutcome, the present author wrote in The Nepali Times, Why would any sane individual choose to entrust his family’s future to a government from which he once fled, when his family’s basic needs are being met in an environment that may allow them no prospect of advancement or improvement, but which is essentially benign? Without any guarantees or safeguards, and in the absence of any third party involvement in the repatriation process, the Bhutanese offer begs many questions.10At the time of writing (November 2003), Bhutan continued to refuse to evencountenance the presence of any third party on its soil to monitor the repatriation process. The UNHCR appeared to have abandoned any hope of performing such a role. In his opening statement to the Executive Committee of UNHCR on 29 September 2003, the High Commissioner for Refugees noted that UNHCR had not 9‘Assembly members question MJC decisions’ (http//www.kuenselonline.com/assembly03/03mjcjuly18.php). 10‘Still unbecoming citizens’, The Nepali Times, 30 May-5 June 2003. 51
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Michael Hutt, The Bhutanese Refugees been able to participate in the verification exercise, and had not been granted access to areas of potential return within Bhutan. This he described as ‘totally unacceptable’,but then proceeded to announce the ways in which the UNHCR would signal its acceptance. Because the Nepal government had offered to grant citizenship to those who wished to remain in Nepal, the UNHCR would promote self-reliance projects, phase out its involvement in the camps, and support ‘resettlement initiatives for vulnerable cases’. The UNHCR would not promote a return to Bhutan, but would merely ‘assist in verifying that returns from Nepal are voluntary’. Finally, he urged ‘States, and particularly neighbouring India, to assist Bhutan and Nepal to identify just, humane and durable solutions for all of these people’.11THE DISMANTLING OF NEPALI DEMOCRACY Recent political developments in Kathmandu certainly contributed to the Nepalgovernment’s volte face on this issue—its sudden willingness, that is, to accept aresolution of the issue that fell short of a return of all refugees ‘in honour and dignity’.The Nepali Congress government and its predecessors had all signally failed to resolve or counter the seven-year-old Maoist insurgency which, combined with thestate’s violent and often indiscriminate response, was quickly leading the country into a condition of civil war. The palace once again became an active and assertive political force after the murder of King Birendra and his family in June 2001, and quickly marginalised the parliamentary political parties. The House of Representatives was dissolved in May 2002 and the king dismissed the PrimeMinister, Sher Bahadur Deuba, on 4 October 2002, on the grounds that he was ‘unable’ to stage general elections. Since then the government of Nepal has consisted of a cabinet of ministers appointed by the king. Until his resignation on 30May the government was headed by Lokendra Bahadur Chand, a previous Panchayat prime minister and a member of the pro-palace National Democratic Party (Rastriya Prajatantra Party). Chand was replaced by Surya Bahadur Thapa, another leader ofthe same party, who like Chand had also served as prime minister under the Panchayat system. It should be remembered that in 1989 the Panchayat government’simmediate response to early warnings of an impending influx of Bhutanese refugeeswas to arrest Lhotshampa dissidents active within Nepal and hand them over to the Bhutanese government. The various governments that came to power in Nepal during the 1990s all adopted a similar policy on the refugee issue: Bhutan should take back its entire people from the refugee camps. However, between 1995 and 1999 unstable coalition governments did little more than pay lip service to this idea. On the onehand, they were distracted by massive domestic problems and, on the other, hamstrung by the commitment given by an earlier government to sort the refugees into categories proposed by the Bhutan government. These governments were apparently willing to allow the problem to fester indefinitely until a solution could be found that was fully consonant with their uncompromising rhetoric on the need fordemocracy and human rights in Bhutan. This probably contributed in some measureto the palace’s more general impatience with the multi-party democracy established inNepal in 1990. The Nepali approach to the Bhutanese refugee problem may therefore 11www.unhcr.ch/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/home. 52
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Michael Hutt, The Bhutanese Refugees be characterised as having moved from one of principled incompetence to an approach dictated by royal realpolitik. A BHUTANESE CONSTITUTION The political situation inside Bhutan also changed during the late 1990s. In 1998, theking ordained that the governance of the country would henceforth be the responsibility of a cabinet of ministers elected to a five-year term by the National Assembly, and in December 2002 the first draft of a Bhutanese constitution was submitted to him for his consideration. This constitution has set out the principles ofstate policies, the rights and duties of citizens, the separation of powers of the main state bodies, the terms on which party political activity is to be allowed. It draws upon local custom and the constitutions of other countries, including India. Predictably enough, Bhutan’s National Assembly has protested that the people of Bhutan would prefer to continue to be ruled by their benevolent, visionary monarch, while external critics have alleged that the 39-person drafting committee is unlikely to take account of minority, particularly Lhotshampa, perspectives.12However, it is conceivable that Bhutan’s first written constitution will represent an advance for Bhutan’s modernisersand a reversal for its traditionalists. Up to now, Bhutan’s state nationalism has had, to borrow the words of Clifford Geertz, ‘a peculiar air of being at once hell-bent towards modernity...’ (English medium universal education, infrastructure development, wider bilateral relations) ‘...and morally outraged by its manifestations’ (democratisation, multiculturalism, globalisation) (Geertz 1973: 244). Until the text of the constitutionis made public, of course, the extent of the changes will remain unknown. THE INDIAN PERSPECTIVE Commentaries on the major social and political changes that have taken place in both Bhutan and Nepal since the departure of the British from South Asia have generally failed to take sufficient account of the role that India has played at almost every stage. Much Western scholarship appears to have an Orientalist attachment to a conceptionof these two countries as driven solely by their own destinies, each with its own internal, sealed-off historical dynamic. Meanwhile, Bhutanese and Nepalese scholars instinctively play down the extent to which New Delhi impinges upon their national politics. Saubhagya Shah argues that India’s relationship with Nepal contains astrong thread of ‘strategic coercion’ and that, although this is widely recognised, neither party is anxious to draw attention to it. ‘The coercer may not wish to appear a bully while the coerced may wish to dispel any idea that he is a weakling’ (Freedman 1998, cited in Shah (forthcoming)). The issue of Indian involvement in Nepal’s domestic politics has cometo the fore in recent years because of New Delhi’s ambiguous relationship with the leadership of the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist). The Maoists’ early rhetoric identified India as an expansionist regional superpower whose army they wouldultimately have to fight during the later stages of their revolution. During 2001, 12See, for instance, Rakesh Chhetri, ‘Bhutan’s Constitution and Refugees’, The Kathmandu Post, 26 December2002. 53
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Michael Hutt, The Bhutanese Refugees however, it emerged that the Maoists’ senior leadership was actually operating from bases in India, and the anti-India rhetoric had by this time completely disappeared from their pronouncements. Latterly, with the Maoists declared terrorists, arrests have taken place of middle-ranking Maoist activists in India, and there have beenseveral extraditions to Nepal. None the less, King Gyanendra’s palace government cannot necessarily depend on unconditional Indian support in its struggle against the Maoists: Indian policy on Nepal’s domestic problems has for some years been characterized by a characteristic lack of focus. This is not true of India’s relations with Bhutan. The refugees and their supporters have repeatedly called upon India to intervene in the negotiations on the fate of the Bhutanese refugees, but India has consistently maintained that the refugee problem is a bilateral issue. However, it has been obliged to abandon this neutral stance temporarily on three occasions. First, when refugees arrived in India from Bhutan: instead of either returning them to Bhutan, or allowing them to remain where they were, Indian security forces forced them to move on to Nepal. The second occasion arose in 1996, when activists in the refugee camps launched a ‘peace march’ from the camps to Bhutan, in order to present an appeal to the king in person. Most of the marchers were arrested by Indian police soon after they crossed the Nepaleseborder, and eventually pushed back into Nepal. The third occasion arose in 1997 when the Bhutanese authorities asked New Delhi to arrange for the extradition from India of Rongthong Kuenley Dorji, a leader of a Sharchop-led oppositional party, theDruk National Congress (DNC), established in Nepal in 1994. For some years the DNC had made common cause with the Lhotshampa organisations and also engaged in low-key political agitation inside Bhutan (see Amnesty International 1998). The timely intervention of local human rights organisations prevented the extradition.Kuenley’s movements are still restricted to New Delhi and he is required to report regularly to the police authorities.13Rabindra Mishra (2003) observed that India’s attitude to Bhutan’s anti-establishment groups has remained diametrically opposite to its attitude towards Nepal’s anti-establishmentgroups... Nepal’s anti-establishment politics has only been able to succeed with the either covert or overt support of India. In contrast, any sign of political activities on Indian soil that might be harmful to Bhutan, whose foreign and defence policies are guided by Delhi under the 1949 Treaty obligations, have been immediately quashed. Thus, the regional superpower refuses to become involved. The UNHCR, charged with resolving refugee crises worldwide, claims that it can do nothing more thanfacilitate resettlement in the country of exile or, failing that, in third countries, because the government responsible for the original exodus will not permit it to play a role. Nepal, already wrecked by an increasingly murderous internal conflict, wasclearly destined to acquiring many thousands of new citizens. If the Bhutanese government has to accept back only a small proportion of the population of the refugee camps, an awkward ethno-political problem will have been defused through selective banishment. This is a solution that 13See the Asian Human Rights Commission report on the case of Rongthong Kuenley Dorji atwww.ahrchk.net/ua/mainfile.php/1997/2/ 54
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Michael Hutt, The Bhutanese Refugees would probably be acceptable to the village nationalists who comprise the majority of Bhutan’s National Assembly. However, it would sit uneasily alongside Bhutan’savowed intention to move towards a constitutional system in which, presumably, citizens will have enhanced civil rights. It is possible, that the intervention of the United States of America, which sees the conflict between the CPN (Maoist) and theRoyal Nepal Army as one of the remoter fronts of its global ‘war on terror’, will result in an outcome that is more favourable to the refugees. A heightening of international interest in this issue appears to have prompted several important steps that have been taken in the bilateral process. It would be preferable to alight upon a local solution to the problem, one that takes into account the concerns of India, Bhutan and Nepal andrespects the rights of the ‘people in the camps,’ who have now endured over a decadeof exile with extraordinary dignity and patience. REFERENCES Adhikari, Krishna. 1995. Community based rehabilitation program for torturesurvivors in the refugee camps in Nepal. Journal of the Nepal Medical Association, 33: 47-52. Amnesty International. 1992. Bhutan: Human Rights Violations against the Nepali-Speaking Population in the South [ASA14/04/92]. London: AI. Amnesty International. 1994. Bhutan: Forcible Exile [ASA 14/04/94]. London: AI. Amnesty International. 1998. Bhutan: Crack-down on ‘Anti-nationals’ in the East[ASA 14/01/98]. London: AI. Aris, Michael. 1994. Introduction. In Michael Aris and Michael Hutt (ed) Bhutan: Aspects of Culture and Development. Gartmore: Kiscadale Publications. Dixit, Kanak Mani. 1992. Bhutan: the dragon bites its tail. Himal, 5(4): 7-30. Freedman, Lawrence (ed). 1998. Strategic Coercion: Concepts and Cases. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Geertz, Clifford. 1973. The Interpretation of Cultures. New York: Basic Books. Habitat International Coalition. 2002. Report on Fact Finding Mission to Bhutan. Human Rights Watch. 2003. ‘We don’t want to be refugees again’. A Human Rights Watch briefing paper for the fourteenth ministerial joint committee of Bhutanand Nepal, May 19, 2003. Hutt, Michael. 2003. Unbecoming Citizens: Culture, Nationhood and the Flight of Refugees from Bhutan. New Delhi: Oxford University Press. John, Aruni. 2000. Potential for Militancy among Bhutanese Refugee Youth. Colombo: Regional Centre for Strategic Studies (RCSS Policy Studies 15). Layoun, Mary N. 1995. (Mis)trusting narratives: refugee stories of post-1922 Greece and post-1974 Cyprus. In E. Valentine Daniel and John Chr. Knudsen (ed) Mistrusting Refugees. Berkeley: University of California Press. Lee, Tang Lay. 1998. Refugees from Bhutan: nationality, statelessness and the right to return. International Journal of Refugee Law, 10(1/2): 118-55. Mishra, Rabindra. 2003. Role of India in Nepal’s Maoist insurgency. Unpublished M.A. dissertation, School of Oriental and African Studies, London, 2003. Muni, S.D. 1991. Bhutan in the throes of ethnic conflict. India International Centre Quarterly (Spring): 145-54. Rose, Leo E. 1977. The Politics of Bhutan. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 55
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Michael Hutt, The Bhutanese Refugees Rose, Leo E. 1994. The role of the monarchy in the current ethnic conflict in Bhutan. In Michael Hutt (ed) Bhutan: Perspectives on Conflict and Dissent. Gartmore: Kiscadale Publications. RGB (Royal Government of Bhutan). 1991. Anti-National Activities in Southern Bhutan: a Terrorist Movement. Thimphu: Department of Information. RGB (Royal Government of Bhutan). 1992. Anti-National Activities in Southern Bhutan: an update on the terrorist movement. Thimphu: Department of Information. RGB (Royal Government of Bhutan). 1993. The Southern Bhutan Problem: Threat to a Nation’s Survival. Thimphu: Ministry of Home Affairs. Shah, Saubhagya (forthcoming). A Himalayan red herring? Maoist revolution in the shadow of the Legacy Raj. In Michael Hutt (ed) Himalayan People’s War: Nepal’s Maoist Rebellion. London: Christopher Hurst and Co. Shrestha, Nirakar Man et al. 1995. A study of torture survivors in CVICT, Nepal. Journal of the Nepal Medical Association, 33: 53-64. Shrestha, Nirakar Man et al. 1998. Impact of torture on refugees displaced within the developing world: symptomatology among Bhutanese refugees in Nepal. Journal of the American Medical Association, 280: 443-48. Sinha, A. C. 1991. Bhutan: Ethnic Identity and National Dilemma. New Delhi: Reliance Publishing House. Sinha, A.C. 2001. Himalayan Kingdom Bhutan: Tradition, Transition and Transformation. New Delhi: Indus Publishing Company. Thinley, Jigmi Y. 1994. Bhutan: a kingdom besieged. In Michael Hutt (ed) Bhutan: Perspectives on Conflict and Dissent. Gartmore: Kiscadale Publications. Thronson, David. 1993. Cultural Cleansing: a Distinct National Identity and the Refugees from Southern Bhutan. Kathmandu: International Institute for HumanRights, Environment and Development. Ura, Karma. 1994. Development and decentralisation in medieval and modern Bhutan. In Michael Aris and Michael Hutt (ed) Bhutan: Aspects of Culture and Development. Gartmore: Kiscadale Publications. van Driem, George. 1994. Language policy in Bhutan. In Michael Aris and Michael Hutt (ed) Bhutan: Aspects of Culture and Development. Gartmore: KiscadalePublications. Zeppa, Jamie. 1999. Beyond the Sky and the Earth: a Journey into Bhutan. London: Macmillan. 56

The ULFA and Bodo militants were invited into Bhutan-Dr S Chandrasekharen

Be decisive on refugee issue

The Kathmandu PostBy Dr S Chandrasekharen 19 August, 2002

The 80th National Assembly of Bhutan, which began on June 25, rightly identified the two most important issues faced by that nation: The problem of Bhutanese refugees in Nepal and the presence of Bodo and ULFA militants in south Bhutan. On both issues His Majesty King Jigme Singe Wangchuck has taken the responsibility upon himself. What the king means by "himself" is not clear at present. But do the members of the National Assembly have the power to deal with the problem decisively? As usual the deliberations were ritualistic. Nevertheless, Foreign Minister Jigme Y Thinley responsible for briefing the refugee issue, and Home Minister Thinley Jamtso responsible for briefing the militant issue, presented the progress of the talks on superficial notes, explaining very little on the difficulties for arriving at the resolution.

The ULFA and Bodo militants were invited into Bhutan with the purpose of quashing the return of refugees from Nepal. The former Home Minister, who now serves as Ambassador to India, was reported to have hob-nobbed with the militants in the 1990s. With increased pressure of the Indian government, Bhutan has opted now to request the militants to leave peacefully, and there had been parlays between the militants and the high officials of the Royal government, including the King. As per the understanding signed with the militants in June 2001, they were expected to shift their camps out of Bhutan in a year’s time. While Minister Jamtso made a bold statement that the militant camps have been reduced as agreed from 10 to 6, the reality is that the number of camps has increased to 30, and there is now West Bengal based militant outfit, called Kamtapuri Liberation Organisation (KLO), establishing its camps in south Bhutan. The Indian army has cordoned off the Indo-Bhutan border. The militants are unwilling to risk the escape, opening up the possibility of armed confrontation in Bhutan which is likely to be bloody and long-drawn. To Bhutan’s disadvantage, the militants are reported to be working in tandem with the al-Qaida members active in the local Muslim communities with the sole purpose of creating disturbances in India. It is a grave concern for the Indian government, and the need to flush out the militants and restore normalcy in south Bhutan becomes India’s priority as well. On the refugee question Minister Thinley was quick to blame Nepal for shying away from its commitment to categorisation and harmonisation of position of the respective governments on each of the category. He attributed the delay to the dissolution of Nepal’s Legislative Assembly, absence of full-fledged Foreign Minister, and Nepal’s pre-occupation in dealing with the Maoist problem. Instead of presenting the difficulties in so-called harmonisation process, to which Nepal has rightly asserted that Bhutan take back all its citizens irrespective of which category they belonged to, Minister Thinley did not hesitate to shift the blame onto Nepal, pointing out its incapacity to put together a team to discuss with him the refugee issue with clarity and competence. Certainly, Thinley is not completely out of tune in making this allegation. A core issue such as this, which has eclipsed the country’s foreign policy over a decade, requires careful handling by a competent authority, for example, custodian of the nation. The political bosses, who come and go, and generally have more shallow understanding than seasoned bureaucrats, are normally given ceremonial role, for example, reading out the press briefings or posing for photograph sessions. In Nepal this has not happened at least in the case of Bhutanese refugee. The politicians have overstepped their responsibilities. The personal visits of Chakra Prasad Bastola and Madhav Kumar Nepal were uncalled for. What has transpired between Jigme Y Thinley and former foreign minister Bastola is a matter of speculation, but certainly Bhutan wasted little time in providing wine and dine to the visiting couple who are considered influential at least in the Koirala faction of the Nepali Congress party. But on the visit of Madhav Kumar Nepal, the Kuensel reported that "before his trip to Bhutan, he had always thought that all the refugees in the camps were genuine Bhutanese citizens and that they were forcefully evicted from Bhutan. However, after coming to Bhutan and meeting with His Majesty the King, the ministers, the civil servants and the people from the private sector, he has changed his view". Nepal has not yet refuted the statement printed in the Kuensel, and he visited Bhutan at the capacity of the leader of the opposition in Parliament. It is a tested hypothesis that "Bhutanese hospitality is hard to resist". In the early 1990s, KES Kirby of The Los Angles Times, Tim McGirk of The Independent and James Clad of Far Eastern Economic Review were made to write what Bhutan wanted. A free trip to western Bhutan, an interview with the King and wine and dine at the hospitality of the Foreign Ministry were necessary to mortgage their professional integrity for false reporting. In fact the full-time job of Sonam Rabgay, then Counsellor at Bhutanese Embassy in Delhi, was to keep the media-men in good humour by extending the Embassy’s hospitality. It is important to understand that the Bhutanese psyche is built around the thesis that even the saints in heaven would be tempted by their hospitality. The issue here is of fairness and justice to the innocent victims, and not of commercial deal. The overwhelming majority of the people in the camps have documentary evidence to prove their origin in Bhutan . Of the 12,804 persons verified at the Khudunabari camp, over 95 percent have such proof. Should the verification process allow to reach to its logical conclusion, over 95,000 of the present 100,000 refugees would qualify to return to Bhutan. At the most Bhutan wants to take one half of 100,000; and this is the crux of the problem. Bhutan knows that the continuation of verification would only embarrass the Bhutanese team as almost all the families are going to produce evidence of their citizenship or of the "forced signing of the migration form". Therefore, what Bhutan has been trying to make Nepal agree is on number. To this end it wants to build pressure on donor community that further support to the refugees is subject to the progress of the negotiation. Some of the donor countries from the European Union have begun to voice Bhutan’s concern that the repatriation of all the refugees would create political instability in Bhutan as they have been exposed to open environment for a long time. It is like a person seeking mercy as an "orphan" after having killed both parents. It was Bhutan which created the refugee problem, it was Bhutan which deliberately delayed the verification process, and it is Bhutan which is unwilling to proceed further verification for fear of having to swallow all the untruths said before. Whether it be the statement of Thinley to the National Assembly of Bhutan, the statement of King to the visiting US Ambassador from Delhi, or responses of the government officials to the visiting UNHCR team in Thimphu— all connote that Bhutan is unwilling to take back all the people identified as Bhutanese citizens in the camps. Nepal has two options: either take principle stand or cut a deal on number. The Bhutanese refugee issue has a deeper ramification for Nepal than seen by outsiders. Letting the issue live as it is will pay positive spin-off in the long-run than dividing the refugee community arbitrarily. Today, Bhutan is not as monolithic as it is perceived by many. The urgency to handle the militants in Bhutan is increasingly catching India’s attention, and this may become a blessing in disguise in the resolution of the refugee problem!

the unknown refugee crisis: expulsion of the ethnic Lhotsampa from Bhutan-Dr Dhurba Rizal


Asian Ethnicity, Volume 15, Number 2, June 2004
The Unknown Refugee Crisis: Expulsion of
the Ethnic Lhotsampa from Bhutan1
DHURBA RIZAL
(United Nations University, Tokyo)
Bhutan has been strained by ethnic conflict. The Lhotsampa, one of the three largest ethnic
groups, have sought a system of equality under which they would be allocated what they
need as an equitable share of Bhutan’s polity and economy. The ruling Drukpa elites
perceived the Lhotsampa as a threat to their dominance and initiated policies to oppress
or force out the Lhotsampa and others through ethnic cleansing. Bhutan’s ethnic conflict
and the refugee crisis it has produced are the outcome of ethnonationalism clothed in the
slogan of ‘One Nation, One People’, and the contrived mechanisation of the ruling elites.
The policies of these elites have effectively disenfranchised people who were born in Bhutan
and have lived there for generations as citizens, for no other reason than their ethnicity.
This is an issue not just for the Lhotsampa of Bhutan but also for any groups at the
receiving end of an ethnically repressive order. The Lhotsampa case illustrates some
characteristics of human-rights violations in situations of ethnic strife.
KEYWORDS: Bhutan, ethnonationalism, refugees, resettlement, militarisation, ethnic cleansing
Introduction
Early in the twenty-first century, Bhutan has an ignominious title. Bhutan is the source of
more refugees fleeing their homeland to escape persecution than almost any other country
in the world. This news is likely to surprise most people worldwide. In the 1990s, media
reportage on refugees continued to tell of refugees fleeing countries in Eastern Europe and,
today, the focus is on refugees fleeing from countries in the Middle East. But concerning
what is probably the world’s largest recent refugee exodus, from this small kingdom
perched on the Himalayas between India and China, it is the flow of refugees rather than
the flow of news about them that has poured out. Here ‘ethnic cleansing’ is alive and well.
It is pursued by a political elite of the now dominant Drukpa Kargupa sub-sect of Buddhism
to expel mostly the Lhotsampa people of Hindu tradition, who this elite fears threaten its
hold on national power and its assertion of Drukpa supremacy.
In this paper, I shed light on the virtually untold tragedy that continues for more than
100,000 Bhutanese people of Nepalese origin who today live in exile, mostly in United
Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR)-administered camps in eastern Nepal.
This is the consequence of an abrasive intersection between layers of ethnicity, religion and
sect—of what happened when a socio-political elite, dominated by Ngalung Drukpa, gained
1 This paper is based on extensive research by the author, a Bhutanese refugee in exile for more than a decade.
The views expressed in this paper are the author’s alone and are not to be taken in any way as representing
the viewpoint of the United Nations University.
ISSN 1463-1369 print; 1469-2953 online/04/020000-00  2004 Taylor & Francis Ltd
DOI: 10.1080/1463136042000221861
152 Dhurba Rizal
a firm hold on the levers of national power in the late 1980s. The still dominant Drukpa
elite has pursued a policy of stringent, self-serving, ethnosectarian nationalism to unify
the country under the catchcry, ‘One Nation, One People’. This has compelled the exodus
of ethnic Lhotsampa and people from other minorities who are aggrieved by deep
discrimination, social ostracism and political suppression. Some have had no choice but to
leave, being cast officially as illegal immigrants. This has created the crisis of Bhutanese
refugees.
I begin with a brief political and ethnodemographic overview of Bhutan, before turning
to consider the origins and nature of ethnic conflict in Bhutan and its causes. I then turn
to the position of the ruling elite towards the Lhotsampa refugees, considering resettlement,
bilateral talks and the possible militarisation of refugees. In the conclusion, I offer ideas
about a possible future path for Bhutan which retains ethnic diversity, and benefits from this
diversity, under a democratically elected government.
A Brief Overview of Bhutan
Bhutan is an independent, sovereign and indivisible kingdom ruled officially by an absolute
monarch. It is landlocked, nestled in the heart of the Himalayas and sandwiched between
two Asian giants—the People’s Republic of China (Tibet Autonomous Region) to the north,
and the Republic of India (Assam, Arunachal Pradesh and West Bengal states) to the south,
east and west, respectively. The Nepalese border is about 100 kilometres to the west. Burma
is further away in the east. Bhutan has long been part of the political disputes and border
confrontations between India and Tibet, and between India and China after establishment
of Tibet as a Chinese autonomous region. Hence, Bhutan is in a geostrategically and
ethnically volatile region.
The King of Bhutan is the head of state and of government. There is no national
election, as the monarch’s rule is hereditary. Each family has one vote in village-level
elections, although universal suffrage to elect local leaders was begun in 2002. The king
functions as the supreme court of appeal and appoints all high-court judges. There are no
legally recognised political parties in Bhutan, but many political parties and pressure groups
are operating from exile to try to democratise the state. There is no bill of rights or written
constitution, and although the King commissioned a committee to draft a constitution in
2001, the draft is yet to be approved.
Bhutan first moved toward a constitutional monarchy in 1969 when the then king (father
of the present king) surrendered the monarch’s veto power over the National Assembly. The
National Assembly was established in 1953 but, until this surrender in 1969, its operations
were completely subject to the king’s veto power, which the present king reclaimed over
the National Assembly after he ascended to the throne in 1972. The unicameral National
Assembly or Tsogdu is the legislative branch, with 150 seats: 105 elected from village
constituencies, 10 representing religious bodies, and 35 designated by the monarch to
represent government and royal interests. Members of the National Assembly serve for
three years. The Council of Ministers, the Lhengye Shungtsog, which is appointed by the
monarch and approved by the National Assembly, manages day-to-day administration.2 The
National Assembly approves the Council of Ministers and its members serve fixed,
five-year terms.
Bhutan is the least populated country in South Asia, although the precise population is
unclear, since data are discrepant. Most information sources that present a population figure
2 Even though the King has devolved executive power to the Council of Ministers (the Lhengye Shungtsog) to
function as head of government, the King is still seen as the fulcrum and locus of power.
The Unknown Refugee Crisis 153
for Bhutan—including scholars, the government’s Planning Commission, and the UN
Population Reports—offer a figure somewhere around 1.4 million. This figure may be too
high, however, since the ruling elites have manipulated population figures to serve their
own political purposes. I suggest that a more accurate figure is somewhere in the range of
800,000–900,000, recognising the full extent of the Bhutanese population now living in
exile outside Bhutan.
Bhutan is a multi-ethnic state, where ethnicity and religion have major import. Ethnic
groups of different religious faiths, and some of different religious sects coexisted under the
monarchy in relative peace, with occasional tensions, for about 97 years. Ethnic conflict—
or more accurately ethnoreligious conflict—has flared after the Drukpa sect gained strong
influence over national policy through the monarchy in the 1980s and rigidly pursued a
divisive ethnosectarian form of nationalism under the banner of ‘One Nation, One People’
to entrench Drukpa dominance. The four broad, but not necessarily exclusive, ethnic groups
are the Ngalung, the Sharchop, the Lhotsampa and several indigenous peoples. All three
main ethnic groups—Ngalung, Sharchop and Lhotsampa—have a distinct identity, shaped
by geographic origin and based on culture and religion.
The Ngalung are people of Tibetan origin who migrated to Bhutan from the ninth
century. They are often referred to in foreign literature as Bhote (people of Bhot or Tibet)
and are concentrated in western and northern districts. The Ngalung introduced Tibetan
culture and Buddhism to Bhutan and comprise the dominant political and cultural element
in modern Bhutan. They speak Dzongkha, which is now the national language.
The Sharchop, who are recognised as Bhutan’s earliest inhabitants, can be traced to the
tribes of northern Burma and northeast India and comprise most of the population of eastern
Bhutan. Although the biggest ethnic group in Bhutan, the Sharchop have been assimilated
to a certain extent into the Tibetan–Ngalung culture. They speak their own language, called
Tsangla.
The Lhotsampa, who live mostly in southern Bhutan and speak Nepali, are the Nepalese
ethnic group whose forebears came to Bhutan from Nepal through ‘step migration’ from
Darjeeling, Sikkim and adjoining areas of northeast India. The government of Bhutan
attempted to limit immigration and restrict residence and employment of Nepalese to the
southern region. However, liberalisation measures in the 1970s and early 1980s in response
to Nepalese action encouraged intermarriage, provided some opportunities for public
service, and allowed more in-country migration by Nepalese seeking better education and
business opportunities.
The indigenous tribal peoples live in villages scattered across Bhutan. They include the
Kheng, Brokpa, Lepcha, Tibetan, Adhivasi and Toktop, all of which are on a much smaller
scale than the three major ethnic groups. Some of these ethnic groups are culturally and
linguistically of Tibetan or Indian Buddhist tradition, while some are influenced by the
populations of West Bengal or Assam and embrace the Hindu social system.
Thus, as a multi-ethnic state, Bhutan is multilingual—with as many as 20 languages
spoken—and multireligious. Mahayana (Kargupa) Buddhism is pursued mostly by the
Ngalung, the Sharchop follow another sect of Buddhism, called Nyingmapa, which is quite
distinct from Kargupa, and the Lhotsampa practice a form of Sanatan Hinduism akin to the
form dominant in India and Nepal. The Drukpa who now form the dominant political elite
are a sub-sect of the Buddhist Kargupa.
The potential of such linguistic, religious and other cultural diversity to divide—or be
manipulated to divide—Bhutanese society has made ethnicity constantly a major concern in
building and maintaining nationhood in Bhutan. Until the early 1980s, the government’s
response to this concern was to try to achieve peaceful accommodation of the ethnic mix
with some reconciliation towards protest by activists who felt national policy disadvantaged
154 Dhurba Rizal
their ethnicity. But when the Drukpa elite gained powerful influence over national policy
through the monarch, it pursued a different, sectarian approach to maintaining nationhood.
It intensified an incipient programme of national unification through ‘One Nation, One
People’ to induce and compel conformity with Drukpa Kargupa culture and tradition. The
most divisive issue in Bhutan from the late 1980s with the assertion of the Drukpa elite has
been accommodation of the Lhotsampa, who the Drukpa fear on the basis of their cultural
difference from other ethnic groups in Bhutan, their religious difference from the nation’s
Buddhist ethnic groups, and what at that time appeared to be the rising proportion of
Lhotsampa within the Bhutanese population.
Officials claimed at that time that the Ngalung, Sharchop and tribal groups constituted
up to 72 per cent of the population, and the remaining 28 per cent were of Nepalese origin.
However, demographic statistics are controversial in Bhutan. As I noted above, ruling elites
have manipulated the population figures for their own political purposes, so all demographic
data need to be treated with caution. As proportions of Bhutan’s population in the late
1980s, estimates for the Ngalung vary from 10 to 25 per cent, for Sharchop and Kheng from
30 to 40 per cent, and for Lhotsampa from 25 to 53 per cent.
Whatever the ethnic composition of Bhutanese society at that time, it is important to ask
what inspired this dramatic, divisive and, for Lhotsampa and some other minority people,
dislocating shift in national policy? What policy measures has the elite used to align
citizenship with ethnicity, to force expulsion of those who it sees as a threat? What
triggered the shift in power relations between the monarchy and others holding influential
positions such that a group from the Drukpa could take the reins of national policy and seek
to ‘ethnically cleanse’ the nation? What is the perception of the Drukpa elites about their
legitimacy to assert Drukpa supremacy and enforce it as national policy? And what has
happened to the Lhotsampa and others who have been forced to leave their Bhutanese
homeland? Let us turn here to consider the deep roots and complex causes of the conflict
that has reconfigured the ethnic, cultural and religious fabric of this nation, particularly from
the late 1980s.
The Origins and Nature of Ethnic Conflict in Bhutan
Bhutan has a long history of ethnic and sectarian tension, and a short history of multi-ethnic
coexistence. After centuries of struggle between Tibetan and Indian political influences and
religious rivalry among Tibetan and Indian Buddhist sub-sects, Shabdrung Thuchhen
Nawang Namgyal united the country under a theocratic independent government in the
seventeenth century. From then until 1907, Bhutan had a dual system of shared civil and
spiritual (Buddhist) rule, and the Drukpa sub-sect emerged under the Shabdrung family as
the dominant religious force. In 1907, an absolute monarchy took control of the nation
under the powerful Wangchuck family, with Ugyen Wangchuck in the position of Druk
Gyalpo, or Dragon King.
Traditional Bhutanese society did not make distinctions between society, polity and
religion. Bhutanese were tribal in social organisation, Lamaist in faith and mediaeval in
their overall orientation. These traditions have now been eclipsed, but they have bestowed
a rich heritage upon the contemporary nation.
Strong Tibetan influence over the locus of national power and dominant Buddhist sect
presented potential for ethnic and religious tension as people from Nepal with Indianinfluenced
traditions and religion came to settle in Bhutan. Nepalese settlers can be traced
to the period of Shabdrung rule. There are frequent references in historical literature to the
migration of Nepali artisans to Bhutan during the reign of Shabdrung Ngawang Namgyel
The Unknown Refugee Crisis 155
in the seventeenth century, although today it appears that no Lhotshampa family can trace
its roots that far back in time.3
In the late-nineteenth century, the Gurung and the Dorjee families were granted
permission by the government to settle Nepali migrants in southern Bhutan. In 1887, the
then ruler of western Bhutan in Paro jointly granted Garjaman Gurung and his father
Dalchan Gurung settlement rights in perpetuity to what is present-day Samchi. In the last
decade of the nineteenth century and first decade of the twentieth century, other Nepali
settlers populated the present district of Chirang, which was administered by the Dorjee
family from Haa in western Bhutan, who were then based in India.4
In 1909, John Claude White, British India’s Political Officer for Sikkim and Bhutan,
noted that, ‘The remaining inhabitants are Paharias,5 the same as those in Sikkim, who are
creeping along the foothills and now form a considerable community extending the whole
length of Bhutan where the outer hills join the plains of India. With the exception of the
Hindu Paharias, Buddhism is the religion professed throughout Bhutan.’ In 1932, a British
officer reported 60,000 Nepali-speaking inhabitants in the southwest of Bhutan. Lhotsampa
who migrated from Nepal to Bhutan cleared forest in Samchi and Chirang and burned the
Gaylegphug and Samdrupjonkhar areas for farmland. These areas were densely forested and
had been considered unsuitable for clearing by the Drukpa because of what they saw as the
lands’ malarial condition. Since settling in southern Bhutan, the Lhotsampa have largely
retained their language, religion and other aspects of traditional culture. The lifestyles of
Lhotsampa thus differ starkly from those of the other main ethnic groups.
Under monarchical rule, the seeds of ethnic conflict have been evident in Bhutan from
the 1950s. The ethnic Lhotsampa have long sought what they believe is an equitable share
of Bhutan’s economy and polity and set up the Bhutan State Congress, Bhutan’s first
political party, in 1952. The Bhutan State Congress pushed ahead with demands for
democratisation, seeking citizenship rights and political representation for Lhotsampa
settlers. The Ngalung minority perceived this development as a threat to its control over
Bhutan, and still refers to this development as ‘the first anti-national revolt’. In a policy of
accommodation, the Bhutan National Assembly enacted the Nationality Law in 1958 and
granted Bhutanese citizenship to Nepalese immigrants.
King Jigme Dorji Wangchuck (1952–72), the third king of the Wangchuk dynasty, was
conscious of the pluralistic nature of Bhutanese society and the imposition of Drukpa
hegemony on the nation’s political, social and cultural affairs. He attempted to move the
country in a limited way towards secularisation. This was a significant step given the
complex nature of Bhutan’s socio-economic, socio-political and socio-religious frameworks,
and the position of the king in Bhutanese society.
However, the present King Jigme Singye Wangchuck, who inherited this position on his
father’s death in 1972, has taken the nation in a different direction. He began his reign with
some moves that were consistent with those of his father; in the late 1970s and early 1980s,
he established Hindu temples and Sanskrit Pathsala in southern Bhutan among numerous
measures for national integration. Yet, from the late 1980s, national policy was given a
complete turn, with reassertion of Drukpa dominance and the King apparently giving the
3 Interviews and informal discussions between the author and a cross-section of Bhutanese people, including
leaders, students and refugees inside Bhutan and in exile (in Nepal and India) in 2002–2003. These interviews
were mostly through informal telephone discussions and a questionnaire survey through e-mail to collect
information from inside Bhutan. I also made several visits to border towns in southern Bhutan to conduct
interviews.
4 Michael Hutt, Unbecoming Citizens: Culture, Nationhood and the Flight of Refugees from Bhutan (Oxford
University Press, New York and New Delhi, 2003).
5 The hill people of Nepal are generally referred to as Paharias. The Lhotsampa migrated to Bhutan from various
hilly regions of Nepal.
156 Dhurba Rizal
Drukpa his support or at least his acquiescence. Aspects of the Drukpa Kargupa sect of
Buddhism were adopted in national policy as the core of the nation’s religion, symbols,
values, lore and legend, and abstract and material forms of heritage were imposed on other
ethnic groups as the Bhutanese national heritage.
In the 1980s, the Bhutanese ruling elite, believing their identity threatened by absorption
of a growing Nepalese minority promulgated a cultural policy of driglam namzha, ‘national
customs and etiquette’. This policy sought to preserve and enhance Bhutanese cultural
identity and bolster Bhutanese nationalism. The policy mandated wearing national dress for
formal occasions and required the Lhotsampa to undertake months of training in Drukpa
traditional etiquette and dress as mandatory requirements for employment. It was accompanied
by a shift in language policy, requiring use of the official language, Dzongkha,
in schools and offices. In 1989, teaching Nepali as an optional language in schools was
prohibited. Further government decrees intensified conflict with ethnic Nepalese, who
sought to maintain their own identity and viewed these edicts as oppressive. Ethnic tension
increased as the after-effects of Nepal’s pro-democracy movement spread to Bhutan, where
Nepalese communities demonstrated against the government in a bid to protect their rights
from the driglam namzha and ‘One Nation, One People’ policy. Political groups in Nepal
and expatriate Nepalese groups in India morally and culturally supported these anti-government,
repressive activities, which further alienated the Lhotsampa Bhutanese inside Bhutan.
The regime in Bhutan has exploited regional and ethnic divides between north, east and
south and has magnified differences between Buddhist traditions. This style of ‘divide and
rule’ through ethnic exploitation of the Bhutanese people has forced ethnic Lhotsampa in
Bhutan to tolerate humiliation and hardship. These circumstances very much support the
claims of Fred Riggs about monarchical rule in traditional societies:
As sovereignty was vested with king and emperor, whose supernatural powers were brought to
bring promises of health and wealth to all people under their rule, revolts were viewed as
sacrilegious provocations more likely to bring divine retribution than worldly benefits. Traditional
hierarchical nations legitimized gross inequities among different cultural communities
and castes or class.6
National integration programmes implemented in the 1980s were cast as fostering
harmony and mutual understanding between different ethnic communities. Yet, as the
slogan ‘One Nation, One People’ implies, government policies sought explicitly to compact
all ethnic groups into a single cultural strand. They were to promote national integration,
national consciousness and national identity to profoundly reshape Bhutanese society and
national identity with Drukpa values and traditions. The government embarked here on a
programme of what Smith has called ‘vernacular mobilization’, in which the ‘genuine
membership’ of the ethnic nation was to be re-educated in the ‘true culture, the pristine
culture of their ancestors, unsullied by contact with modern civilization’.7
Achieving ‘genuine membership’ in the Bhutanese case also meant taking steps to
identify and expel many people in Bhutan by denying them legal status. By 1988, the
authorities’ fear of Lhotsampa dominance inspired the conduct of an official census
exclusively in southern areas, where the Nepalese constituted a majority, precisely for this
purpose.
Given the purpose of these moves toward ‘national integration’, incorporating a form of
ethnic cleansing to achieve ‘genuine membership’ of the ethnic nation, it is no wonder that
these moves inflamed ethnic tensions between Bhutan’s ethnic groups. The moves also
6 Fred W. Riggs, ‘The Rise and Fall of Political Development’, in S.C. Long (ed.), The Handbook of Political
Behavior, vol. 4 (Plenum Press, New York, 1981), p. 25.
7 Anthony D. Smith, The Ethnic Origin of Nations (Blackwell, Oxford, 1986), p. 151.
The Unknown Refugee Crisis 157
intensified the cultural, political, social and economic marginalisation of the Lhotsampa,
just as they were designed to do. Lhotsampa responded with peaceful democratic protest to
have the newly implemented laws repealed. But instead of giving the protestors a
sympathetic hearing and trying to alleviate their grievances, an insensitive national government
cracked down on the demonstrators. It carried out a series of arrests and atrocities
against the Lhotsampa and forcefully evicted them from their homes and land. As the
violence and atrocities escalated, the Lhotsampa began to flee Bhutan simply to save their
lives, even though they had lived in Bhutan for generations.
Issues concerning immigration, population growth, cultural hegemony and individual
freedom coalesced in the elites’ antagonism toward the Lhotsampa. As a result, contemporary
Bhutan faces problems generated by ethnonationalism which mix ethnicity with social,
political, cultural and religious factors and produce some episodes of violence. The push for
democratic reforms from outside as well as inside Bhutan has further compounded the
problems confronting the ruling elites.
We see, then, how the current refugee crisis brought on by the fleeing Lhotsampa stems
from the insecure, feudal monarchial system ruling Bhutan. The dominant Drukpa elite has
perceived cultural and religious diversity as a threat to the regime’s hegemony and has
pursued policies of ethnic expulsion and absorption to try to eliminate this perceived threat.
The objectives of those who came to dominate the monarchial system from the 1980s are
to protect the interests of the Ngalung minority and entrench the Drukpa religious sect that
the ruling elite, who are largely from this minority, upholds. The interests of this powerful
elite are cast as the interests of the nation. Importantly, they have the monarch’s official
sanction. Thus, the attempts to Drukpanise Bhutan through ‘One Nation, One People’ and
driglam namzha indicate the state of the monarchical system and the nature of government
in Bhutan today. These developments signify the emergence of a national power centre that
is not within the monarch but is in the hands of a religiously motivated regime. It is a return
to practical theocracy, but in the name of the monarchy carried out succinctly through the
slogan of ‘One Nation, One People’.
Causes of Ethnic Conflict in Bhutan
As the discussion above reveals, the causes of the current ethnic conflict in Bhutan are
multiple and complex, deeply entrenched in ethnicity, language, religion and citizenship.
This conflict is very much a product of socio-economic and political transformation in
Bhutan from the 1980s. Especially from the late 1980s, the elites have manipulated state
apparatus to embed the trappings of the Drukpa Kargupa sect in national identity. They
have used political propaganda, scapegoating and exclusivist citizenship to demonise and
drive out the Lhotsampa and cultivate support from the Ngalung. But how did a small group
of traditionalist elites gain access to the levers of national power under monarchical rule and
position itself to rebuild a theocracy? Put simply, through marriage—marriage that brought
into the current monarchy what is claimed to be a pre-monarchical theocratic ruling family,
and importantly brought the Drukpa elites whom this family serves back into a position of
extensive influence over national policy through the monarchy.
King Jigme Singye Wangchuck supposedly married privately in 1979 four sisters who
are claimed to be descendants of the Shabdrung, the rulers of the theocratic system of
government that ran Bhutan until the monarchy came to power in 1907. This family was
of the Drukpa Kargupa sect. In 1988, to legitimise the eventual succession to the throne of
his oldest son, the King married the four sister queens in a public ceremony. The dramatic
shift in national policy following the public marriage in 1988 signals how this served
officially to legitimise the new elites’ access to national decision-making and gave them the
158 Dhurba Rizal
opportunity to dominate the monarchy. The almost total marginalisation of many royals
close to the late king and the present queen mother is further testament to this power shift
within and beyond the monarchy.
The public marriage into the current monarchy of the four sisters, who were presented
to the public as lineage of pre-monarchy Shabdrung rulers, created ethnic conflict over the
locus of state power. This marriage ultimately resulted in the new elite—with its pseudo
roots in an older ruling elite—consolidating its hold on economic, political, social and
military power. The new elite’s self-interested perspective of appropriate political and
socio-cultural conditions for maintaining the peaceful coexistence of ethnic groups in a
unified Bhutanese society has instead created the ethnic cleavages with which Bhutanese
society is now riven. This is due largely to elites’ narrow pursuit of self-serving policies,
especially on crucial issues such as national integration, political stability, ethnic harmony
and communal peace. In all these areas, the elites have failed to provide the political and
social space, where multiple voices from across the country could be expressed freely and
used to inform a broadly based national policy which respects ethnic diversity rather than
imposed and enforced mono-ethnicity.
The most widely held thinking has accepted cultural friction rooted in ethnic and
religious differences as the main cause of the nation’s ethnic conflict. This view accepts that
the Bhutanese government dominated by Drukpa–Buddhist Ngalung elites has responded to
fears that its Buddhist-based culture was being swamped by the Hindu traditions and
cultural practices of the Lhotsampa. However, another perspective contends that the real
causes of this conflict are born of the elites’ fears about losing political and economic
dominance more than losing cultural dominance. Below, I offer my explanation of the
causes of ethnic conflict in Bhutan, which is a synthesis of contributions from both schools
of thought.
Political Factors
Often, the main political factors which contribute to ethnic conflict derive from the failure
of the state to create effective and fair political institutions. Conflict and violence result
from clashes of interest when institutional arrangements deny fair representation across
society and allow domination by some political actors who reject the voice of others with
different needs and priorities in distribution and redistribution of resources. Deliberate
neglect of an ethnic group within the population or deliberate action to exclude or suppress
an ethnic group by those who run the political system are powerful motivators for ethnic
conflict. In Bhutan, we see how from the late 1980s the government’s approach shifted from
years of relative neglect to proactive exclusion and suppression. Let us consider how these
approaches are manifest in Bhutanese government policies and have intensified ethnic
conflict between the Bhutanese people in a bid to sustain the dominance of the Drukpa elite.
Nationality and Citizenship
The ruling elite from the 1980s has used citizenship as a powerful mechanism to exclude
or expel Lhotsampa and others of Nepalese origin. During the early 1980s, all adult
members of the Bhutanese population from age 18 years were issued with a printed
citizenship card. Citizenship in Bhutan is based on ethnic lines. After years of peaceful
struggle, the Lhotsampa were granted citizenship and some rights as citizens in 1958
through the Royal Edict on Lhotsampa Citizenship Act.
But the 1958 act has been revised or replaced a number of times. The 1985 Citizenship
Act currently in place states that Bhutanese citizenship can be acquired only by birth,
The Unknown Refugee Crisis 159
registration or naturalisation. For citizenship by birth, both parents must be Bhutanese,
instead of at least the father as required in the 1977 act and either of the parents as required
in the 1958 act. Citizenship by registration requires evidence of permanent domicile in
Bhutan on or before 31 December 1958. Citizenship by naturalisation requires fulfilling a
number of criteria that Lhotsampa farmers cannot meet easily, such as fluency and literacy
in the national language, Dzongkha.
The census I mentioned above, which the government conducted in 1988 only in the
Lhotsampa-dominated southern districts of Bhutan, sought to identify Bhutanese nationals
strictly in accordance with the provisions of the 1985 Citizenship Act. The census identified
the population under seven categories: Fl Genuine Bhutanese citizens; F2 Returned
emigrants; F3 Dropout cases (i.e. people who were not around at the time of the census);
F4 Children of a Bhutanese father and non-Bhutanese national mother; F5 Non-Bhutanese
national father married to Bhutanese national mother and their children; F6 Adopted
children; and F7 Non-nationals.
The Lhotsampa were asked to show 30-year-old land-tax receipts as proof of their
citizenship under the 1958 Act. However, since payment of land tax was mandated across
the country only in 1964, this requirement was particularly difficult for the Lhotsampa to
fulfil.8 The Home Ministry, which conducted the census and demanded the 30-year-old
receipts from the Lhotsampa farmers, was itself established only in 1968. Some observers
claim that that the requirements of the 1985 Citizenship Act would not have posed a major
problem if implemented fairly during the census, since most Lhotsampa have retained their
tax receipts.9 Yet after the census, even the Lhotsampa who had their 1958 receipts have
been evicted from Bhutan and with nowhere to go, most have been relocated in refugee
camps in Nepal. The intention of the census was clearly to weed out those who the
authorities saw as their unwanted demographic opponents. As testament to the ethniccleansing
purpose of the census, one can find in these refugee camps in Nepal some
Lhotsampa who still have their land tax receipts dated even before the establishment of the
Wangchuk Dynasty as Bhutan’s hereditary monarchy in 1907.
This episode of denial of rights to citizenship corroborates Brown’s claim that denial of
citizenship and the implicit equal rights that come with that status is a common source of
friction within multiethnic communities and often leads to demonstrations and even calls for
secession.10 Moreover, the 1985 Citizenship Act and subsequent government policies
directly contravene Article 15 of the 1948 United Nations Universal Declaration of Human
Rights which states: ‘Every one has the right to nationality. No one shall be arbitrarily
deprived of his [sic] nationality or denied the right to change his [sic] nationality.’11
Bhutan’s ruling elite has made citizenship a tool to exclude the ethnic groups that it fears,
rather than, as the UN decrees, a basic human right.
Marriage Laws
In conjunction with citizenship requirements, the government introduced strict marriage
laws in 1980 to have retroactive application from 1977. These laws involved punitive
measures against any Bhutanese married to a non-Bhutanese national, or such a Bhutanese
person who chooses to take this step. In these circumstances, the Bhutanese citizen is, from
8 ‘Resolutions of the Twentieth Session of the National Assembly’, Bhutan, Autumn 1964.
9 D.N.S. Dhakal and Christopher Strawn, Bhutan: A Movement in Exile (Nirala Publications, Jaipur, India,
1994), pp. 179–82.
10 Michael Brown, ‘Causes and Implications of Ethnic Conflict’, in Michael Brown (ed.), Ethnic Conflict and
International Security (Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1993).
11 See United Nations Universal Declaration, 1948, Article 15.
160 Dhurba Rizal
the day of marriage, denied promotion in government services, not promoted beyond the
rank of sub-divisional officer, ineligible for employment in national defence or the Foreign
Ministry, and ineligible to seek candidacy to contest election for the National Assembly or
any local government bodies. They are deprived privileges provided by the state such as
distribution of land, loans, medical treatment abroad and grant of investment capital. They
also forfeit their right to government assistance for education and training. These punitive
marriage laws provide a type of long-term reinforcement to the citizenship laws, particularly
since marriage is the site of reproduction of future Bhutanese citizens.
Mandatory Clearance Certificate
In September and October 1990, many Lhotsampa took part in a peaceful demonstration in
support of human rights and democracy in Bhutan. The government responded by clamping
down even more heavy-handedly on the Lhotsampa, introducing draconian new rules
requiring them to verify their status. It required all Lhotshampa to produce a No Objection
Certificate (NOC) or Police Clearance Certificate to obtain access to what is, for other
Bhutanese, their automatic rights as citizens. These include their children’s admission into
schools, promotion in the civil service, a passport, a state scholarship, eligibility to take
civil-service examinations and even to apply for jobs in the government service.
The NOC rule is still in force and eligibility for this certificate is tightly controlled. The
Bhutanese government declared as racist and anti-national not just the participants in the
1990 pro-democracy and human rights movement, but also all who sympathised with the
movement and those who opposed government policies. The government holds all these
people ineligible for the NOC. Even family members who did not participate in the
movement were also declared anti-national and were forced to leave Bhutan. Through this
draconian rule, the government effectively deprived several thousand Lhotshampa children
their right to education by denying them admission to schools.
The primary intention of the Bhutanese government in using these severe punitive
measures was to force out of the country an ethnic group which the ruling elites feared was
a threat not just to the Ngalung’s cultural fabric but also to the elites’ own hold on power.
The NOC is the most oppressive policy tool that the Bhutanese government has wielded and
is still in force.12 As the government intended, this tool has deprived the rights of
Lhotsampa Bhutanese as citizens.
The ‘One Nation, One People’ Policy
In the name of national integration and promoting Bhutanese nationalism, the government
has used the rhetoric of ‘One Nation One People’ to justify its policies of ethnic cleansing.
These policies seek to erode the culture, religion and language of the Lhotsampa, the
Sharchop and other minority ethnic, religious and linguistic groups to bolster the dominance
of the Ngalung people and the Drukpa sect of which the elites are part. The ‘One Nation
One People’ platform focuses on what the government claims is the need for a distinct
‘national identity’—an ethnically exclusive Kargupa Buddhist identity. This policy seeks
explicitly to purge Bhutanese society of its diversity by forcefully imposing Drukpa values,
customs, lore, symbols and traditions on a multi-ethnic and multicultural society. This
12 Human Rights Watch in May 2003 noted that still ‘citizenship status and government documents including a
“No Objection Certificate” are required for access to higher education, government jobs, movements through
the country, registration of land and trade licenses’. See ‘We Do Not Want to be Refugees Again’, a Human
Rights Watch Briefing Paper for the 14th Joint Ministerial Committee of Bhutan and Nepal, 19 May 2003,
p. 16.
The Unknown Refugee Crisis 161
Table 1. Representation of ethnic groups in key government positions (%)
Estimated
Director Share Royal Council Deputy
of National of National Ministers/ Advisory General/
Council Secretaries Ministers Director Population Assembly
Ngalung 10–25 51 80 89 67 100*
Sharchop 30–40 * 20 38 33 *
11 Lhotsampa 11 30–45 0 0 0
Total 100 100 100 100 100
*The combined figure for Sharchop and Ngalung.
Sources: Dhurba Rizal, Administrative System in Bhutan: Retrospect and Prospect (Adroit
Publishers, Delhi, 2002), pp. 120–9; UNDP List of Senior Royal Government of Bhutan
Officials, UNDP, Bhutan, July 2002; various issues of Kuensel (Bhutan’s national newspaper)
at http://www.kuenselonline.com.
policy attempts to make a nation not just of ‘One People’ but more diacritically of ‘One
Drukpa People’.
The Green-belt Policy
This policy initiative, put forward in late 1988, could not be implemented. It sought to
create a kilometre-wide green belt along Bhutan’s border with India, where human
habitation would be prohibited. The targets of this policy were in particular the people in
southern Bhutan, such as in the Chittagong Hill Tract of Bangladesh where the border with
India is longest. If this programme had been implemented, it would have resulted in
uprooting one-third of Lhotsampa people from their land and homes. The programme could
not proceed, however, since the intending donors refused to fund the project. While
environmentally sound, it was motivated by the ethnic overtones of the government’s
political strategy manifest in the ‘One Nation, One People’ posture.
The Structure of Political Institutions
The structure of the political system in Bhutan sustains domination of national policy
mostly by Ngalung elites. The law and implicit mechanisms severely restrict the participation
of others in the political system. The civil service, army, police, National Assembly
and other vital organs of government are all dominated by Ngalung elites and, if present
trends of patronage and nepotism continue, this domination will continue for decades. For
instance, if we look at who occupies positions in the vital organs of government from
Minister to Director level (Table 1), we see that representation does not reflect the nation’s
ethnic composition and is unjust.
Senior positions in the government are dominated by Ngalung and, after them, by
Sharchop. The representation of both groups in these positions is less than these groups’
shares of the national population. For the Lhotsampa, however, there is one single person
at director level to represent these people who constitute 30 to 45 per cent of the national
population. These data shed some light on how Ngalung, representing about 15 per cent of
the population, have suppressed and exploited the remaining roughly 85 per cent of the
population. Bhutan’s political system lacks the basic institutions needed effectively to
162 Dhurba Rizal
accommodate the needs of people from all sections of society. The Ngalung elites have used
the structure and regulations of the political system to marginalise the Lhotsampa from the
nation’s political institutions and to fuel ethnic discontent and resentment.
Economic Factors
Economic factors are important in ethnic conflict all over the world. The understanding is
usually that economic capacity can be directed towards actions against the government, so
governments aim for the economic weakness of their perceived opposition. The ruling elites
in Bhutan appear to have followed this logic. They have used their control over economic
policy levers and bureaucratic process to weaken those who they perceive as their
opposition, mostly the Lhotsampa, with discrimination put to work through multiple
channels. The Lhotsampa must produce a security clearance certificate to obtain licenses
from the government, to obtain financial loans and to undertake any business venture. As
noted above, these certificates are issued only to the Lhotsampa whose family members are
not living in exile and have not been involved in the democratic and human rights
movements. This makes it very difficult for Lhotsampa and others to pursue opportunities
for their own economic gain, and even for developmental activities and projects that would
strengthen the national economy.
The government is now pursuing an economic programme of market liberalisation and
privatisation of state assets. Yet this is benefiting primarily the ruling elites and their family
members and presents further opportunities to exclude the Lhotsampa economically.
State-owned enterprises were transferred to elites at throwaway prices to consolidate the
elites’ economic power. Crony capitalism is gripping Bhutan and is creating an island of
prosperity for wealthy elites midst an ocean of deep poverty. The UNDP Poverty
Assessment and Analysis Report of 2000 states: ‘The average income per person per month
is as low as [US] $1. There are widespread disparities between urban and rural poor
households…Regionally, the income of most blocks in the districts of Gasa, Trongsa,
Zhemgang, Trashiyangtse, Pema Gatshel and Samdrupzonkhar (primarily in eastern and
southern Bhutan), appears to be below the national average.’13 Economic marginalisation by
the ruling elites has contributed greatly to the creation of ethnic cleavages in Bhutanese
society.
Socio-cultural Factors
The cultural differences between ethnic groups in Bhutan have been abraded since the
1980s by government policies deliberately seeking to re-engineer culturally a society of
diverse ethnicity, culture, language and religion. Some apparently punitive moves, such as
the 1988 census, the citizenship and marriage laws, and the clearance certificates have
sought to fragment the polity on ethnic lines and expel those of ‘undesirable’ Nepalese
ethnicity. Other policies, especially under the ‘One Nation, One People’ slogan, have aimed
to drive away those who resist Drukpa Ngalung re-enculturation and to re-enculturate with
Drukpa Ngalung culture those who remain. The ruling elites believe that their Drukpa
traditions, culture and religious practices are superior to those of the Lhotsampa and other
non-Buddhist ethnic groups. They therefore do not recognise Bhutan’s ethnic diversity as
a potential source of strength, and they pursue ‘One Nation, One People’ to replace this
13 UNDP, ‘Poverty Reduction and Economic Development: Monitoring Poverty in Bhutan’, UNDP Discussion
Paper, October 2002, p. 2.
The Unknown Refugee Crisis 163
diversity with a monocultural society free of foreign intrusion and sources of resistance to
the regime’s policies.
Driglam Namzha and Dzongkha Language
Above, I noted how the government took up the strategy of enforcing driglam namzha for
all Bhutanese. This policy targeted Lhotsampa for ‘overnight’ assimilation into the Drukpa
fold, compelling them to adopt Bhutanese culture, tradition and social etiquette, with a
heavy monetary fine for non-compliance. This policy has sought to absorb culturally the
Lhotsampa within Bhutanese society and erode their identity as a distinct ethnic group.
Language policy that is also aimed to this end expanded the use of the Dzongkha national
language and banned Nepali from the school syllabus and other sites of crucial human
engagement such as offices and any site of government business including the parliament.
These cultural policies have far-reaching consequences for other ethnic groups as well as
for the Lhotsampa. The results of these policies have had onerous consequences for almost
all in Bhutanese society through contributing to the breakdown of ethnic harmony that for
decades underscored relative peace inside Bhutan. However, preparing the way for eventual
assimilation of non-Drukpa groups in south and east Bhutan was only part of the ruling
elites’ motivation for pursuing this feudal cultural policy of Drukpanisation. The elites had
another key reason for pursuing this policy: to undermine the unity of various groups and
interests opposing the regime.
Religion
In Bhutan, as elsewhere, religion is a crucial part of the identity of some individuals and
ethnic groups. As Querol has observed, religion can be a key source of individual or group
understandings of the appropriate relationship between authorities and individuals.14 Religion
and sect have long histories as sites of contestation in Bhutan, particularly between
Tibetan and Indian sources of influence. They have become contested sites again from the
1980s, while one of the main concerns that have troubled the influential Drukpa Buddhist
elite about the Lhotsampa and some other ethnic groups is their Hindu religion. The elite
has officially committed the nation to Drukpa Kargupa Buddhist ideology to try to weaken
the social and political order that holds the Lhotsampa together. However, this move has
triggered religion-based communal conflicts, religious fanaticism and the creep of religious
fundamentalism into local-level electoral politics. Indeed, the development of politics
shaped powerfully by religion and ethnicity is one of the main reasons behind the rise of
conflict in Bhutanese society.
The Drukpa Cultural Revivalism Movement
The actions of the elites concerning language, clothing, ‘customs and etiquette’ and religion
are all aspects of a Drukpa revivalist movement cultivated by the Drukpa elite since the
1980s. The movement seeks to reawaken Drukpa Kargupa faith and revive former Drukpa
customs and traditions such as driglam namzha. Recent trends suggest a government agenda
to purge Bhutanese society of its multi-ethnic, multicultural and multireligious richness,
recognising in this diversity what the elites see as unwanted cultural elements of ‘foreign’
(non-Tibetan) origin. Ethnic cleansing of the Lhotsampa is part of this move. The extreme
expression of Drukpa revivalism and Buddhist fundamentalism is in the changing of place
14 Marta Reynal Querol, Ethnicity, Political System and Civil Wars (Bellaterra, Barcelona, 2002), p. 5.
164 Dhurba Rizal
names to eradicate cultural traces of the Lhotshampa from state and public memory. The
Nepali names of places such as Chirang, Sarbhang, Samchi and Pinjuli in southern Bhutan
have been replaced officially with Drukpa-sounding names such as ‘Tsirang’, ‘Sarpang’,
‘Samtse’ and ‘Penjoreling’.
External Factors
Speaking broadly, the ruling elites’ concern about two nations, Nepal and India, is crucial
here. We can better understand this concern when we recognise that the current Bhutanese
elites are of Tibetan origin and Bhutan has for centuries been the site of tension between
those seeking to bring influence from Tibet and others seeking to bring influence from
Nepal and India.
Fear of Nepal
In contemporary times, the elites’ fear of people with Nepalese background in Bhutan was
sparked by three developments in particular. One was the Gorkha Land Movement which
pushed for a separate land for Nepali speakers in India in the 1980s. The second was the
so-called ‘Greater Nepal’ concept, a bogey to incorporate all Nepali-speaking areas into one
fold of Greater Nepal. Third, Bhutan’s royal elites, who are closely related to the Chogyal
royal family of Sikkim which is now an Indian state, also cite the example of how Nepali
speakers helped the Indian government to merge Sikkim with India.
Yet these fears in Bhutan about people of Nepalese origin are ill founded. The
Lhotsampa have never sought, nor plan to seek, to undermine the sovereignty and integrity
of Bhutan. To the contrary, the Lhotsampa are more concerned about maintaining the
sovereignty and integrity of Bhutan as reflected in many proceedings of the National
Assembly, and the Lhotsampa have continued to raise the issue of unequal treaty
agreements with India to seek a better outcome for Bhutan. Sikkim became a part of India
owing to its intricate geo-political location in relation to what at the time were frayed
Sino-Indian relations rather than due to the actions or support of Nepali speakers in Sikkim.
And while it is true that Nepali language provides an obvious connection between Nepali
speakers, the thread is weak. Notions of a Nepali Diaspora are culturally charged, but they
are not politically motivated as the ruling elites suggest. Thus, the elites’ strategy to play
the ethnic card by pitting ethnicity against ethnicity is a response partly to their own
misperception. The elites have inflated and manipulated this fear as a strategy which enables
them to dominate the monarch in national decision-making.
In the interests of its own survival, the ruling elite deliberately peddles this ill-founded
propaganda to the international community as well. One target are international aid donors,
from whom the Bhutan government seeks favour and material support. But the propaganda
is also to inform—or misinform—international audiences generally. It is to shut out the
voice of the Lhotsampa and others who are on the receiving end of the regime’s oppression,
and could expose to the world this regime’s ethnic cleansing and other actions that violate
human rights and international law. In helping to prevent these versions of the story of this
regime from reaching international audiences, the already severely limited knowledge of
Bhutan in the international community is further limited and distorted. And those outside
who would ethically oppose this regime as oppressor and would support Lhotsampa and
others as the oppressed are kept literally out of earshot. We could describe this as epistemic
oppression. It has contributed directly and indirectly to the current crisis in Bhutan.
The Unknown Refugee Crisis 165
Relations with India
Around two-thirds of Bhutan is bordered by India and, for reasons that are historical and
political as well as geo-strategic, Bhutan is highly dependent on India. India has played a
major role in shaping the public policy of Bhutan under an unequal bilateral treaty of 1949.
There are various perspectives on India’s role in Bhutan’s refugee crisis. A popular school
of thought holds that India has an explicit hand in creating and fuelling this crisis.
Numerous actions of the Indian government support this view, including:
• dumping inside the Nepalese border the Lhotsampa refugees who took shelter in the
Indian states of Assam and West Bengal after fleeing persecution in Bhutan, effectively
denying these refugees passage back to Bhutan through Indian territory;
• a hands-off attitude in bilateral talks with the Bhutanese government about the refugee
crisis;
• allowing an influx of more Indian people into Bhutan;
• extensive exploitation of Bhutan’s natural resources, particularly water resources, since
1990;
• arresting Bhutanese democratic leaders and activists against the spirit of the 1949 treaty;
and
• providing tacit support to Bhutan’s ruling elites at the cost of innocent citizens and
refugees.
The Indian government has turned a blind eye to the unfolding crisis and has been
off-hand in negotiating a workable solution and repatriation of refugees. This response
suggests that the Indian government may have a hand-in-glove relationship with the
Bhutanese government on this issue. The Indian government’s attitude of ‘hear no evil, see
no evil, speak no evil’ certainly may have inclined the ruling elites in Bhutan to believe
they could act with impunity in pursuing ethnically exclusive policies which, even today,
marginalise the Lhotsampa politically, economically and socially. Indeed, as unrest intensified
in Bhutan in the early 1990s, the Indian government pledged as much assistance
as it could to help the Bhutanese government deal with the problem and assured Bhutan that
it would protect India’s borders against groups seeking illegal entry to Bhutan.
India has its own compulsions in the region. The refugee problem presented a challenge
to India, which needed to balance its interests in maintaining Bhutan’s stability with two
other important needs. One was not to inflame nationalist fervour among India’s ethnic
Nepalese population and the other was not to upset India’s relations with Nepal or Bhutan.
These considerations were at least partly why the Indian government prohibited the use of
Indian territory as a staging ground for protests by Lhotsampa and others from Bhutan.
India appears unlikely to take serious action towards the crisis. However, a number of
scenarios could change this stance: if the crisis becomes militant with the help of insurgents
from northeast India; if Indian interests in the region are jeopardised; and if the Bhutan
government refuses in future to meet the Indian government’s request that it flush out
Indian insurgents from hideouts in Bhutan. If the Bhutan government refuses to serve the
Indian government’s interests, the latter is likely to weigh into the crisis, promote a
movement of Bhutanese exiles, and may move to establish a democratic government of its
choice in Bhutan, all of which provide a degree of compulsion for the Bhutan government
to comply with Indian government requests. In recent years, India has been under
international pressure to use its influence to achieve a satisfactory solution to the problem,
but what that influence will be and what it will produce remain unclear.
166 Dhurba Rizal
An Overall Assessment
What light does the above discussion of political, economic, social and external factors cast
upon the present circumstances of Bhutan and the crisis confronting the refugees who have
fled from there? We can see both as the outgrowth of a long-running struggle for fair
representation in the political, social and economic life of the nation that members of a
relatively large ethnic group consider as their legitimate homeland. These people, mostly
Lhotsampa but others as well, have been oppressed and marginalised on the basis of their
ethnicity, by the highest powers in their land. The struggle intensified in the 1980s—especially
the late 1980s—when a shift in power relations enabled by the sovereign king’s
marriage returned to the national helm people who were said to be descendants of the
Drukpa pre-monarchy rulers, strengthening the political hand of the Drukpa elite over
national decision-making. The Tibetan-origin, Kargupa Buddhist Drukpa were alarmed at
the growth of the population of Nepalese-origin Hindu Lhotsampa inside Bhutan. The now
Drukpa-dominated government feared that the Lhotsampa threatened to overwhelm the
ethnic, political, economic and socio-cultural balance in Bhutan’s society, particularly if the
Lhotsampa were allowed fair representation in the political life of the nation.
This government has chosen a far-reaching strategy of mono-ethnic sectarianism that
unequivocally rejects ethnic diversity. It has pursued policies of political exclusion,
exclusive citizenship and cultural conversion in an attempt to cleanse Bhutanese society
ethnically. It has manipulated fear to create deep socio-cultural cleavages among those who
remain in Bhutan. It has used populist tactics to gain support among the ethnic groups close
to these ruling elites’ own ethnicity. And it has attempted in many ways to mute dissent,
particularly through driglam namzha and language policy which truncate cultural and
political expression by those who are not of Ngalung ethnicity, by censoring the media and
by expelling perceived opponents. These actions are to assert and safeguard Drukpa
interests and consolidate the present regime’s hold over the nation.
Policies implemented under the ‘One Nation, One People’ slogan have sown seeds of
resentment, disharmony and confrontation. These policies have further institutionalised
discrimination and inequality, assigning explicit priority to Drukpa interests in every area
of political, economic and socio-cultural life. Thus, while these policies target ethnic
Lhotsampa, they also deliver severe blows to the aspirations for equality and justice on the
part of the Sharchop and some ethnic minorities. Consistently, the constitution proposed by
the current regime can serve only to institutionalise the inequalities perpetrated by the new
elite. Drafting of the constitution has never taken into account the needs or aspirations of
the Lhotsampa, despite their significant share of the national population. The ‘One Nation,
One People’ slogan has thus been used to license the regime to further the system of
oppression which entrenches the privileges of the Bhutanese elites.
Those who are part of the ruling Drukpa oligarchy project their self-serving actions as
legitimate. These oligarchs conveniently rationalise to the public that they are personally
entitled to national dominance on the basis of their lineage and superior rank, which they
claim is prescribed traditionally in Bhutanese culture. Their privileges are thus based on
ascription, but they are serviced by mythologised history and cultivated discrimination.
They may also be founded on outright deception. No compelling evidence has been
presented to the public to verify the claim that the kings’ four wives are truly of the
pre-monarchy Drukpa heritage, as the power-hungry Drukpa elites suddenly claimed with
the advent of the public marriage in 1988. Nor has there been evidence to verify the claim
about the king’s earlier ‘private’ marriage to the four sisters in 1979, which was not
announced to the public until the supposed ‘second’ marriage in public.
The peaceful resistance practised by the oppressed since the late 1980s suggests that
The Unknown Refugee Crisis 167
institutionalised inequality under this repressive order will invite continued attempts from
within and outside Bhutan to destabilise the regime. The ‘One Nation, One People’ platform
and the Drukpa-dominated proposed constitution exclude two-thirds of Bhutan’s population
from political participation and leave this large segment of society alienated. Relationships
between different ethnic groups are strained by mistrust and discrimination. Even today, the
oppression and persecution continue unabated in Bhutan, marginalising the Lhotsampa and
some others economically, politically and socially.
Such repression of many Bhutanese may have slid a ticking bomb under the social and
political privileges of the ruling Drukpa elites, who rule by force and live in fear that at any
time the potent instability that marks Bhutanese society today will ignite into revolutionary
fire. Meantime, there is another unresolved ‘problem’. The actions of the Drukpa regime
have not only left the nation an ethnopolitical tinderbox, they have left as stateless refugees
more than 130,000 Lhotsampa and others who have been forced to flee Bhutan.
Ruling Elites and Ethnic Lhotsampa Refugees
The present Bhutanese crisis is explained well by Smith, who has observed how the rise of
nationalism can force the flight of an excluded minority. According to Smith:
Whereas territorial nationalisms are content to endow their nation with a common history and
mass culture, such that people of different origin can join and participate in both, ethnic
nationalisms predicate shared history and culture on a myth of common ancestry, i.e. on
ethnicity in the narrowest sense… Here lie the seeds of a collective exclusiveness that so
frequently begets persecution and homelessness. Ethnic nationalism does not involve a
specifically racist component, but manages to exclude non-members and deny their rights,
while preserving their essential humanity. Instead of being exterminated, they are rendered
homeless… They are felt to constitute a threat to the continued existence and purity of the
emergent ethnic nation. They must therefore be denied citizenship in their own land, rendered
defenceless and homeless, and ultimately driven out.15
The case of Bhutan is practical testament to this general observation. From the late 1980s
in Bhutan, the rise of a regime pursuing stridently ethnonationalistic policies has forced the
flight from Bhutan of Lhotsampa and others of excluded minorities. It has rendered them
persecuted, defenceless, homeless, and has ultimately driven them out—while the authorities
pursue creation of the emergent Drukpa-dominated ethnic nation of Bhutan. A UNHCR
report claimed that in 2002, refugees from Bhutan numbered around 134,000.16 Another
report located these refugees with 110,800 housed in UNHCR-administered camps in
eastern Nepal, 21,200 taking shelter in northeastern India and West Bengal, and the
remaining 2,000 outside the camps.17 A Human Rights Watch briefing paper noted that the
refugees have experienced growing frustration, anxiety and a feeling of deprivation about
their lack of nationality, their uncertain future, their inability to pursue higher education and
their unemployment.18
Refugees and Resettlement in Bhutan
Former UNHCR Chief Sadako Ogata has spoken out about how the vast majority of
refugees are driven from their homes by human rights abuses. As she explains, ‘Persecution,
15 Smith, The Ethnic Origin of Nations, p. 153.
16 UNHCR, ‘Refugee Population 2002’, an annual report published by the United Nations High Commissioner
for Refugees (UNHCR, Geneva and New York, 2003).
17 These unpublished data were collected and compiled by the Bhutan National Democratic Party for internal use.
18 ‘We Do not Want to be Refugees Again’, p. 7.
168 Dhurba Rizal
torture, killings and the reprehensible practice of “ethnic cleansing” generate a huge flow
of refugees’. Her comment well describes the Lhotsampa and other Bhutanese refugees,
who from 1990 were driven from their homes by the oppression and persecution of the
Bhutanese government. Between one-fifth and one-seventh of Bhutan’s population now live
as exiles in the northeast of India, West Bengal and in refugee camps in Nepal.
Inside Bhutan, the government has undertaken a programme known as ‘resettlement’,
which brings people from other parts of the country to settle permanently on the lands
formerly owned and occupied by those who have been forced to flee. In June 1997, the
National Assembly rubber-stamped authority to ‘transfer’ population from the northern and
eastern parts of Bhutan to ‘resettle’ in southern Bhutan on the land of the Lhotsampa who
are now refugees mostly in Nepal. A high-level National Resettlement Committee was
formed to implement the resettlement programmes. The resettlement programme is deliberately
to prevent the return of the refugees and makes resolution of the refugee crisis more
complex and much more difficult.
In the first phase, as a pilot project the government announced resettlement in the south
of 370 landless Sharchop families from Trashigang in the east. The government selected
these Sharchop families for three reasons in particular. One was to win domestic support
for its ‘resettlement’ programme. Another was an attempt to legitimise its expulsion of
Lhotsampa through ethnic cleansing. The third was a bid to pacify the grievances of the
Sharchop, after many had staged mass protest meetings in the mid-1990s, and some
prominent Sharchop dissidents in exile had formed a political party to lobby against the
Bhutan regime from outside Bhutan.19
The government had already begun to distribute land left behind by the Lhotshampa in
Chirang, Sarbhang, Samchi, Dagana and other parts of southern Bhutan from the last week
of December 1997. In 2003, more than 70 per cent of the land belonging to those now in
exile had been resettled, covering most of five districts in southern Bhutan. Recently, an
additional 150 families have been brought into Samdrupjonkar, and about 600 families have
been promised resettlement in Samchi.20 People from the highlands were reluctant to settle
in the more tropical south, and the government paid cash to each selected household as
incentive to resettle. The government makes out that it conducts the resettlement programme
at the request of Nepali-speaking villagers. However, this is a wily fabrication. The
real objective is not to ‘settle the landless’, who have been landless since long before 1997.
This programme is permanently to prevent the repatriation of refugees and force them to
assimilate in Nepal. It is to form what is, for the ruling elites, a ‘demographic balance’
which enables them to consolidate the political, economic, social and cultural power of the
Drukpa sect.
The government’s actions therefore present a paradox. On the one hand, government
officers interview refugees and participate in bilateral talks for the refugees’ eventual
repatriation. But on the other hand, the government continues its resettlement programme
in southern Bhutan onto the lands of the refugees in exile. Another part of this picture that
reveals the government’s true intentions is the camps that it is establishing in Bhutan, where
it intends to keep the repatriated refugees. This situation is similar to the concentration
19 The president of the Druk National Congress, Rongthong Kinley Dorjee, is a prominent Sharchop dissident
from east Bhutan who helped to form the Congress as a political party in exile in 2000. In 2001, at the request
of the Bhutan government, the Indian government arrested him on charges of contravening the Foreigner
Registration Act, against the Indo-Bhutan Treaty of 1949, and he was placed under virtual house arrest. For
further discussion see my book: Dhurba Rizal, Administrative System in Bhutan: Retrospect and Prospect,
Adroit Publishers, Delhi, 2002, especially Chapters 3, 4 and 5.
20 Internal documentation of the Bhutan National Democratic Party (BNDP), Kathmandu, Nepal, produced for
Party use.
The Unknown Refugee Crisis 169
Table 2. Results of the JVT Verification of Khudunabari Camp
Declared jointly
by JVT and Number
endorsed of refugees
by Nepal Bhutan in each
Original Status Ministerial Committee category %
293 2.4 Bhutanese Bhutanese
70.55 8,595 Bhutanese Re-applicant Bhutanese (voluntary
migrants)
Bhutanese 2.85 Bhutanese with a criminal record 347
Bhutanese 2,948 Non-Bhutanese 24.2
12,183 100 Total
Source: Various Joint Press Releases issued by His Majesty’s Government of Nepal and the
Royal Government of Bhutan from 1993 to 2003; unpublished documents of the Bhutan
National Democratic Party (BNDP); various issues of Kuensel and Kathmandu Post.
camps that the Bangladesh government established for the tribal Jumma people. R.B.
Basnet, president of the Bhutan National Democratic Party (BNDP) noted of these camps
that it is ‘like moving from the frying pan into the fire. It is nothing but moving from one
camp to another. We are still refugees in our own country.’21
Bilateral Talks
By the end of February 2004, there had been 15 rounds of ministerial-level talks between
the governments of Bhutan and Nepal, and four at foreign-secretary level. These produced
little in the way of resolution. In October 1993, the talks led to a system for classifying
refugees under four categories,22 and the Joint Verification Team (JVT) assessment
(completed in mid-2003) of refugees in one camp, Khudunabari in Nepal, according to
these four categories. These categories are: (1) bona fide Bhutanese; (2) Bhutanese who
have migrated; (3) non-Bhutanese; and (4) Bhutanese who have committed criminal acts.
The Fourteenth Joint Ministerial Committee (JMC) meeting in Kathmandu in May 2003
agreed to a ‘settlement’ of the problem. But as the South Asia Analysis Group opined of
this meeting, ‘There could be no greater betrayal than what has transpired’.23 Here the JMC
agreed that the bulk of the refugees should be treated as citizenship applicants, not as
citizens. This has created tangled legal problems with domestic, regional and international
dimensions, problems that compound the issue of returning some refugees to what is now
‘resettled’ land but was previously theirs. If we take as an example the Khudunabari camp
chosen for the official refugee verification, almost all of the refugees (95 per cent in
Khudunabari) will be made stateless, even if they are repatriated, as we see in Table 2.
Only 2.4 per cent (293 people) of the 12,183 refugees in this camp were recognised as
21 ‘Refugees Aghast at Repatriation’, Kathmandu Post, 17 April 2003, p. 1.
22 See press releases of His Majesty’s Government Nepal, the Ministry of Home and Foreign Affairs, and the
Royal Government of Bhutan on bilateral talks from 1993 to 2003. Also check through http://www.rcss.org.
23 ‘14th JMC between Bhutan and Nepal at Kathmandu: A Raw Deal for the Refugees’, South Asia Analysis
Group, Note 186, 4 June 2003.
170 Dhurba Rizal
bona fide Bhutanese citizens, while 24.2 per cent (2,948) were classified as non-Bhutanese
citizens.
For those in Category 4, who are classified as ‘criminals’, the Bhutanese government
applies the draconian National Security Law (1992) and the Law of Thrimsung (penal code)
recognising any act of conversation and correspondence ‘criticising the King and the
government’ as a treasonable offence. Thus, people in this category who are called
‘criminals’ in autocratic Bhutan, we can also recognise as the forerunners of human rights
and democracy for Bhutan. All Bhutan’s pro-democracy activists are classified under this
category and will not get justice under the current regime. As dissidents, they will be treated
as ‘disloyal’ and purged, ostracised or marginalised in Bhutan.
Those in Category 2 will be able to reapply for citizenship, but their application will be
treated like that of any other foreigner seeking naturalisation under the 1985 Citizenship
Act. This act requires that a person applying for Bhutanese citizenship must have resided
in Bhutan for at least 20 years, must be able to speak, read and write Dzongkha proficiently,
and must not have acted against the king, country and people of Bhutan in any manner
whatsoever.
This means that the refugees will have to wait for 20 years as stateless persons to even
apply for citizenship. Naturalisation is not simply a matter of law but is the prerogative of
the government, so even after waiting 20 years, the refugees are not guaranteed citizenship
status. The government will apply its harsh, discriminatory laws against the refugees once
they are back inside Bhutan, and no one can protect the citizenship and human rights of
refugees. Thus, the bulk of the refugees could become stateless, perhaps indefinitely.
However, under intense international pressure, in the fifteenth round of the bilateral
talks in October 2003, the government of Bhutan accepted the classification of 76 per cent
of refugees in Khudunabari camp as Bhutanese citizens. It agreed to review the appeals
made by refugees classified under Category 3 as non-Bhutanese, and to repatriate refugees
under Categories 1, 2 and 4 by mid-February 2004. Yet as discussion in this paper has made
clear, the real intention of the Bhutan government is not to accept and reintegrate the
refugees back into Bhutanese society, but to maintain the new demographic balance
post-ethnic cleansing for as long as possible to consolidate this regime’s power. For
example, government officials created obstacles while reviewing the appeals of refugees
under Category 3 in January 2004 and simply returned to Bhutan. Today, they remain
evasive about their commitment to repatriate the refugees of the verified camp in
Khudunabari, and they have not even started verification in the six other camps.
The JVT is seen as a farce. The German Ambassador in Nepal claimed that the
agreement between the governments of Nepal and Bhutan on refugee repatriation involved
face-saving measures for the Nepalese government.24 As one who watches the Bhutanese
side, I believe the same can be said for the Bhutanese government. I recognise a number
of inherent weaknesses in the JVT report.
• The Report has huge inconsistencies. For example, it classifies more than 150 minors
who were not even born in Bhutan under the category of ‘criminal’ with their parents,
and for parents who have been categorised as non-Bhutanese and ineligible to return to
Bhutan, their children have been categorised as Bhutanese and are eligible to return and
reapply for citizenship.
• There can be no fair treatment of appeal. All refugee appeals are to be made to the same
body that denied the refugees their right to return to Bhutan.
• The procedure of verification and reporting of results was not transparent.
24 ‘Nepal Presented Face-Saving Way: Lemp’, Kathmandu Post, 17 July 2003.
The Unknown Refugee Crisis 171
• There is no guarantee that refugees who return to Bhutan will be treated fairly.
• Returnee refugees will be housed in places other than their own homes and lands.
• The UNHCR will not be involved in verification, repatriation and rehabilitation of
refugees.
• There is no indication of procedures for reintegrating refugees in Bhutan under prevailing
autocratic conditions.
The Bhutan government’s weak response and hands-off attitude intensify the problems
here. The past actions of this regime indicate that it had no genuine intention of reversing
its oppressive policies towards the Lhotsampa and others who it sought to expel or weaken,
such as the Sharchop. For instance, the Bhutan government rejects third-party involvement
in monitoring the refugee repatriation processes, so resettlement continues without monitoring.
The backdrop to repatriation of these refugees is, inside Bhutan, one of perpetual
repression: statelessness, proposed stay at concentration camps and eventual resettlement
somewhere in the country where, like all Lhotsampa, the returnees will be permanently
marginalised politically, economically and socially. This must raise fundamental questions
about the basic principle of refugee repatriation. Today, there are vivid examples of a
dreadful backlash against refugee repatriation, in the repressive feudal environment of
Myanmar (the Rohinya refugees from Bangladesh), Kosovo (the return of ethnic Serbs) and
Rawanda (return of the Hutu refugees from the Democratic Republic of Congo). Even if the
refugees are repatriated, the present authoritarian regime will marginalise and deny basic
rights to those of Lhotsampa ethnic identity. It is therefore highly unlikely that the cosmetic
solution that the two governments have agreed to implement can bring a durable and
satisfactory resolve, let alone justice for the Lhotsampa refugees.
A solution satisfactory for all can be achieved only with the active involvement of the
UNHCR in verification, harmonisation, repatriation and rehabilitation of these refugees.
Exclusion of the UNHCR and any other non-political organisation in the verification
process will weaken the legitimacy of the process. One of the major challenges that the
refugees from Bhutan face today is that the UNHCR has a non-political mandate, while the
imperatives for verification and repatriation are not exclusively humanitarian, they are also
political.
I strongly urge that the UNHCR recognises the increasingly politicised nature of the
Bhutanese refugee crisis and becomes involved in the complete process of verification,
repatriation and rehabilitation of these refugees. This body should also become involved in
actively galvanising solid political support for the creation of an environment inside Bhutan
which is suitable for the returning refugees. The rationale of repatriating refugees and
maintaining at least their safety hangs under a heavy cloud until the influences of the ruling
elites are neutralised, those involved in ethnic cleansing are brought to justice, and
institutions are introduced to deliver a democratically elected government. The need of the
hour is to mobilise broader support internationally by calling on democratic countries such
as Japan, the US, India and countries of the European Union to make a firm commitment
to pressure Bhutan to introduce a fairly representative polity, as some governments have
done towards Afghanistan. The current bilateralism of this refugee crisis—marginalising the
UNHCR and repatriating refugees under less than satisfactory circumstances—is set to
diminish the hard-earned power accorded to refugees internationally, after years of human
struggle and suffering. It could also serve to circumvent the now internationally recognised
ethics of refugee repatriation, and to prevail over these people already subjugated by 14
years of oppression and expulsion from the homes by the same repressive regime to which
they will be subjected again.
172 Dhurba Rizal
Possible Militarisation of the Refugees
Militarisation is the accumulation of a capacity for organised violence and a will to deploy
it. Ethnonational militarisation has increased throughout the world in the last two decades,
particularly in South Asia, despite the expectations of some that economic development,
modernisation and continued globalisation would reduce both the practice of ethnonationalism
and the ethnic conflict it can produce. The passions awakened by ethnic nationalism
lead to militarisation as testified by the Palestinian Intifadas.
Ethnic wars have characteristics that distinguish them from other types of conflict. First,
ethnic wars usually last longer than other conflicts, as reasonable solutions are difficult to
achieve. Secondly, a main feature of ethnic war is the geographical distribution of ethnic
groups. When major ethnic groups of a nation belong to regions where they are the
dominant, geographic proximity helps to foster development of ethnic identity. For
example, the comparatively late evolution of the nationalistic surge of Tamil identity in Sri
Lanka can be attributed to the pre-independence (before 1948) isolation of the Jaffna
peninsula, where the population is 97.5 per cent Tamil.25 If an ethnic group has been
isolated historically and perceives it has little or no bargaining power, insularity may
strengthen the group’s demand for greater autonomy or self-determination.
The distinctly separate geographical isolation and cluster living in southern Bhutan has
contributed to strengthening Lhotshampa ethnoconsciousness, which by and large began to
emerge in the late 1980s in response to the regime’s actions directly against the Lhotsampa.
Fear about calls for a Gorkhaland for Nepali-speakers as a separate state across the border
in India may have triggered the Drukpa repression of the Lhotsampa population. However,
the expulsion of around one-seventh of Bhutan’s Lhotshampa population in the early 1990s
has only strengthened the Lhotsampa’s association with their ethnic identity. Deprivation
and the need to fight a common persecutor, as we see now with the Lotsampa, can trigger
collectivising around a shared identity that in turn can trigger militarisation. For instance,
when Palestinian refugee youth plunged into both of the Intifadas, this gave the Palestinian
refugees a sense of national cohesion that they had never experienced, which in turn
reinforced their desire to support the refugee youth who had taken up arms.
In the Lhotshampa context, we can see parallels with cases such as Kampuchea in 1978
for reclamation of land and home, the first and second Intifada in the West Bank and Gaza
protesting against occupying Israeli forces, Palestinian refugee warriors taking action
against protracted official inaction after waiting more than 50 years for a solution to their
dislocation, Hmong Hill tribes of Laos and Jumma tribes and Bangladesh protesting against
their forced integration, and the Sri Lanka Tamil Diaspora. All of these struggles have
pushed or pulled refugees to engage in conflict.
In the case of the Lhotsampa refugees, a key factor that could push towards formation
of a refugee movement would be protracted official inaction and unjust or unfair results of
the JVT in determining the refugees’ repatriation to Bhutan. Negotiations between the
governments of Nepal and Bhutan have so far produced little of substance, and refugees’
patience is wearing thin. The regional proliferation of national liberation movements
surrounding them may push Lhotsampa refugee youths towards forming an active refugee
movement. Lhotsampa have faced the prospect of forced cultural assimilation and resettlement.
Their desire to reclaim their homes and land is coherent and strong. Moreover, some
refugees have re-settled in foreign countries, and this may act as external support which can
be supplemented by regional ethnic Diaspora for weapons and training to refugee youths
forming militant groups.
25 For population data refer to the census documents published by the government of Sri Lanka.
The Unknown Refugee Crisis 173
My extensive interviews with refugee youths, adult refugees and refugee leaders, as well
as my observations and experiences for the last 14 years, reveal a latent militancy which,
at present, sits dormant and smouldering within the Lhotsampa people. They are naturally
frustrated at what they see as the unjust Joint Verification Team Report and endorsement
of it by the Fourteenth Joint Ministerial Committee meeting. My interviews with these
people have also revealed a clear divide between what the elder leadership expects of the
youth and how the youth see the future themselves. The elder refugee leadership has
advocated a process of peaceful dialogue for the past decade, but the refugee youth feel that
this has been fruitless. They believe the movement should adopt new strategies to achieve
a tangible political resolution to the problem. Many of the youth with whom I spoke felt
that their ethnic group had been severely discriminated against in Bhutan and expressed a
strong desire that ‘justice be done’. They expressed intense anger about their present
situation and indicated that they would not ‘sit around and wait forever for a fac¸ade of a
political solution’ to the present crisis.
My overall assessment of this situation based on conceptual and empirical work is that
there is some possibility the Lhotsampa youth will take up arms to become a militant group.
There seems to be very slim chance of the refugees assimilating with the host population.
The main considerations shaping my assessment include the following:
• The absence of strong leadership among the refugees may leave a vacuum that refugee
youth could attempt to fill by taking up arms.
• Many of the refugees are not well educated, which could delay both the further
politicisation and international exposure of their plight, which are crucial components of
effective militant activism. However, the Lhotsampa youth are relatively better educated
than their elders. And education may anyway not be such an important factor. Even
literacy levels do not necessarily play a major role in grassroots rebel movements, as
reflected by Maoists in Nepal and the Jumma of Bangladesh.
• The regions surrounding the camps are hotbeds of Communist and Maoist activities.
• Funding for higher education of refugee youths has been stopped from 2003. This may
make youths more susceptible to violence and extremist activities.
• Refugees are not allowed to work outside the camps, even though the standard of their
education and skills is higher than that of people in nearby communities.
• It is alleged that many Lhotsampa youths have joined the rank and file of the Maoists of
Nepal and are being trained by them. The Times of India reported in May 2003 that a
section of the refugee youths has developed close links with the Maoists. Members of this
group are frustrated with the failure of the decade-long movement by the Bhutanese
parties to achieve their repatriation. A new political party has been formed with the help
of the Maoists, after consolidating in Nepal. Despite a ban on all political activity in
Bhutan, the underground Maoists launched the Bhutan Communist Party (Marxist–Leninist
Maoist) and distributed pamphlets across Bhutan.26
• When viewed in the context of other refugee movements, we see that the Lhotsampa may
be just coming out of a stage of denial and deprivation and moving towards the next
stage—of anger and frustration at their situation, which they may choose to express
through militant action.
• We cannot know in advance what is the threshold of Lhotsampa anger, beyond which
they perceive militancy as legitimate because it is their only option. Certainly, the
refugees see as unjust and unfair the outcome of the JVT Report and endorsement of this
report in May 2003 by the Fourteenth Joint Ministerial Committee. This, or some other
26 The Times of India, Kolkata, 19 May 2003.
174 Dhurba Rizal
focal point of anger, may accentuate their grievances and push them towards militancy
to achieve justice for their people.
• Even if the refugees are repatriated as Full Citizens or Applicant Citizens, if they are
housed in concentration camps for two years, without fair political, economic and
socio-cultural rights, militancy is likely to erupt inside Bhutan due to the suppression and
exploitation of this large segment of the population.
• More youths may become available who will want to join the present group and will be
prepared to resort to militancy. These youths could be encouraged by the regional
proliferation of national liberation movements, external support, a Nepalese Diaspora,
refugees left out after being classified as non-nationals and refugees who have settled
abroad.
The Lhotsampa youths see they have little to lose and much to gain by drawing
international attention to their plight.27 The experiences of the Palestinian Intifada and the
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in Sri Lanka provide textbook examples of
militant refugee communities developing several years after initial grievances first drew
them together. Usually, it is the second generation of politically aware youth who takes up
arms after becoming frustrated at their own situation and at their elders’ inability to bring
about a political solution. My interviews with Lhotsampa refugee youths indicate that, if a
timely solution cannot be reached, the dire situation may force them to join a militant outfit
at any time.
Popular perception of the Lhotsampa refugee problem is that there have been neither
activism nor marked progress on the issue for last 14 years. The roots of militancy are now
in their infancy and might develop into full-scale militancy if a just and equitable solution
is not reached in the near future. Unless significant progress is made towards a just and fair
resolution of the refugee issue, the governments of Bhutan, Nepal and India may face
considerable problems in the near future on this issue. I agree fully with Julia Traft who,
as Director of the Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery in the United Nations
Development Programme, opined this about desperate and vulnerable refugees: ‘When they
are unable to provide their children with security and roots in culture, they become
susceptible to political influences like Mao’s insurgency in Nepal. This should be a concern
not only to Nepal but also to Bhutan.’28 In 2003, two new groups supported by insurgent
groups in the region were formed to translate the rhetoric of possible militarism into
political reality.
The Bhutan Gorka Liberation Front
The Bhutan government had at various times pressured two political groups, the United
Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA) and the National Democratic Front of Bodoland
(NDFB), to wind up their operations in Bhutan. However, in July 2003, these groups set
up another operation in Bhutan called the Bhutan Gorka Liberation Front. The Indo-Asian
Service remarked: ‘By propping up the Nepalese group, ULFA and NDFB are obviously
planning to cash in on the unrest among Bhutan’s ethnic Nepalese population.’29 This move
was in keeping with the tactics usually adopted by ULFA. It may add more fuel to the
already burning issues of refugees and ethnosectarian conflict in Bhutan.
27 ‘Bhutanese Refugees Taking to Crimes’, Times of India, 20 January 2003, p. 1.
28 Julia Traft, Director, Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery, UNDP, ‘Discussion Paper’, May 2003, p. 3.
29 Rezaul H. Laskar, ‘Anti-India Group Prop Up Terror Outfit in Bhutan’, Indo-Asian News Service, 16 July
2003.
The Unknown Refugee Crisis 175
Bhutan Communist Party
This party was formed in April 2003 in Siliguri in India, with a mission to wage a people’s
war similar to the one under way in Nepal seeking to overthrow the monarchy and establish
a People’s Republic.30 In July 2003, it was reported that members of this party participated
in a meeting of the South Asian Revolutionary Movement (RIM) in India.31 Like the Bhutan
Gorka Liberation Front, this party was set up in 2003 in response to the Bhutan
government’s almost total neglect of refugee issues and frustration with the failure of the
Bhutanese parties to address refugee repatriation effectively, even after 14 years. The
establishment of these two bodies may be a manifestation of latent militancy evolving
among the Bhutanese refugees today.
Conclusion
The phases of the Lhotsampa’s experiences in, and exodus from, Bhutan since the late
1980s present almost a paradigmatic model which generally describes the pattern of ethnic
conflict. Ethnic diversity within a nation can lead to struggle for fair representation and
resources if some groups are excluded structurally from opportunity for full participation in
the political, economic and socio-cultural life of the nation. Tensions cultivated particularly
through fear of ethnic difference deepen cleavages within the society along ethnic lines.
With intensifying ethnic conflict, one group will use whatever means it can to seize control
of the state and implement policies that deliver ethnic repression, discrimination and
systematic human rights violations upon their perceived opponents, to bolster the group’s
own hold on power.32
This process has been under way in Bhutan particularly from the late 1980s. The
Drukpa elite firmed its access to power over the nation and has since carried out systematic
human-rights violations. In this paper, I have explained how the self-serving, ethnosectarian
Drukpa elite has tried to deracinate the Lhotsampa and confine this group as a peripheral
community despite the Lhotsampa’s considerable share of the national population—now
considerably less inside Bhutan as a result of these deracination attempts.
Ethnic conflict is deepening in Bhutan. National Assembly debates since 1990 have
brought the issue of race to the forefront in various policy discussions. The debate over a
pseudo constitution is flavoured heavily with racial connotations. Bhutan is still a relatively
peaceful country compared with some others that are wracked with ethnic conflict. But we
must beware of complacency, especially in the current climate of worsening ethnic tension.
Deep and active discrimination against the Lhotsampa has served to strengthen ethnic
identification among the people of Lhotsampa origin. An ever deeper ethnic divide is now
pitting the major ethnic communities, particularly around the Ngalung, against the Lhotsampa
and Sharchop. We have witnessed in Bhutan the rise and consolidation of an
ethnocracy which dominates the institutions of government, economy and society and fuels
ethnic tension by promoting its own ethnic group at the expense of others.33
The Drukpa are a majority in Bhutan with a minority complex and a short political
vision. The short-term benefits that the Drukpa elite’s ethnically divisive policies may
achieve for some cannot compensate for the long-term social, economic and political costs
30 The Times of India, 18 May 2003.
31 www.Nepalnews.com, 15 July 2003.
32 J. Macgary and B.O. Leary (eds), The Political Regulation of Ethnic Conflict (Oxford, London, 1993),
pp. 12–16.
33 Francis Stewart, ‘Working Paper on Democracy and Development: Three Cases’, unpublished paper, University
of Oxford, 2002, p. 18.
176 Dhurba Rizal
for the nation at large. These are not just the costs of discrimination and denial of
opportunity for the Lhotsampa and others, who could have contributed much to the nation.
It is also the immeasurable cost that comes from a society now riven along ethnic and other
lines by the fear, mistrust, resentment, frustration and anger that the regime has deliberately
fuelled. And as I have considered towards the end of this paper, there is now the dangerous
possibility that smouldering grievances on the part of those who are oppressed and expelled
may be pushed into militancy in a desperate attempt by some to achieve a just and equitable
solution, to what now appears an intractable problem.
But there are other ways to achieve a just and equitable solution that beg to be explored
first. Pragmatism informed by broad-minded understanding of national and regional history
dictates that Bhutan cannot be a homogenous state, despite government attempts to make
it so through the ‘One Nation, One People’ ethos. Bhutan has always been multi-ethnic;
what is today the nation of Bhutan is a construct several centuries ago of various ethnic
groupings with a rich diversity of racial, religious, cultural and linguistic attributes. The
only workable option for Bhutan is that of a pluralistic society that harnesses its diversity
as a source of opportunity, richness and strength. This prefigures a nation that achieves
unity in diversity rather than, as at present, being pulled apart by those who seek to subvert
the potential virtue of this diversity to serve their own narrow interests.
The sectarian nature of the ruling elite must also be considered. Religion and state have
a long history of entanglement in Bhutan. The marriage to Bhutan’s sovereign King, of
members of a family supposedly dominant in theocratic, pre-monarchy days before 1907,
greased the wheels for religious influence to return to the state apparatus, inspiring the
ethnosectarian nationalism that is the flagship of the current Drukpa regime. I argue for a
secular state for Bhutan, where religion has nothing to do with the affairs of state and is,
instead, the personal faith of an individual. The secular state of Bhutan needs to be
governed through a broadly based democratic political system which is fairly representative
of the Bhutanese people. This of course requires relocating sovereignty from the monarch
to all the people of Bhutan, once they have been fairly resettled after their years of exile
outside Bhutan. Lhotsampa people have struggled for years to try to achieve movement
towards democratic government, a move that many consider as an essential perquisite for
national integration.
Mine is therefore a call for a radical restructuring of Bhutan’s political, economic and
socio-cultural systems in pursuit of equitable development of all Bhutanese communities.
Ethnocracy has certainly not achieved this aspiration. To the contrary, the nation is poor,
underdeveloped and deeply divided. The King serves the interests of a small, sheltered
ethnonationalistic elite. And between a fifth and a seventh of the population have lived in
exile—and in deep desperation and anger—since the 1990s.
Yet the victims of ethnic oppression can be any ethnic community subordinated to the
power of another. The latter fears the people of the former group on the basis of their
ethnicity and capacity to challenge, or unseat, the latter’s oppressive domination. Ethnic
strife in Fiji, Bosnia, Rwanda and South Africa also illustrates ethnic oppression and its
consequences. The crucial concern here is thus much larger than the Lhotsampa of Bhutan;
it is the treatment of any peoples who are pushed to the receiving end of an ethnically
repressive order. I therefore hold that our attention must respond not just to the special
claims of particular groups in Bhutan. At stake is the ethical issue of a just order, politically,
economically and socio-culturally, in any national context.
Acknowledgements
The author would like to acknowledge the generous support provided by the Japan Society
The Unknown Refugee Crisis 177
for the Promotion of Science (JSPS) to carry out this research project. The author is highly
indebted to Professor Yozo Yokota, Special Adviser to the Rector of the United Nations
University and Dr Jean Marc Coicaud of United Nations University, for their intellectual
guidance and support.
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